Sentence Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the Need for Sentencing Reform by Yantus, Anne
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 47
2014 
Sentence Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the Need 
for Sentencing Reform 
Anne Yantus 
University of Detroit-Mercy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legislation 
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anne Yantus, Sentence Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the Need for Sentencing Reform, 47 
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 645 (2014). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol47/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SENTENCE CREEP: INCREASING PENALTIES IN MICHIGAN
AND THE NEED FOR SENTENCING REFORM
Anne Yantus*
The governor and several legislators have requested review of Michigan’s sentenc-
ing practices with an eye toward sentence reform. Michigan leads the country in the
average length of prison stay, and by internal comparisons the average minimum
sentence has nearly doubled in the last decade. This Article explores cumulative
increases to criminal penalties over the last several decades as reflected in amend-
ments to the sentencing guidelines, increased maximum sentences, harsh
mandatory minimum terms, increased authority for consecutive sentencing, wide
sentencing discretion for habitual and repeat drug offenders, and tough parole
practices and policies. The reality for legislators is that it is much easier to increase
a penalty than to decrease it, but the continued incremental increases in penalty
and sentence length over the years have led Michigan to the point of necessary
sentence reform.
INTRODUCTION
There are two constants in the criminal justice system: poor
human behavior and legislative efforts to address that behavior. In
the latter category is yet another constant: frequent legislative revi-
sions to the appropriate punishment. What follows is a look at
increasing criminal penalties and sentence length in Michigan, fo-
cusing on the last four decades and especially the fifteen years since
the advent of the statutory sentencing guidelines. The wisdom of
specific legislative acts may be debatable, but their results are not.
Michigan now leads the country in the average length of prison stay
and incarcerates more than 43,000 people.1 This Article explores
the pattern of increasing penalties in Michigan as reflected in the
* Anne Yantus teaches criminal sentencing and appellate advocacy as an adjunct
professor at the University of Detroit-Mercy School of Law. She lectures frequently on
Michigan sentencing law and co-authored a chapter on circuit court sentencing for Michigan
Criminal Procedure (ICLE, 2010). She has served on the editorial advisory committee for the
Michigan Judicial Institute’s Criminal Procedure Monograph 8: Felony Sentencing (2012) and is
involved in on-going meetings within the Department of Corrections to revise the format of
the Michigan presentence report. She serves as managing attorney of the sentencing/plea
unit of the State Appellate Defender Office. The author would like to thank Bill Moy, Sheila
Robertson Deming, and Amy Neville for their wisdom and invaluable comments, and
Barbara Levine and Daniel Manville for their vast knowledge of the Michigan parole process.
1. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER
PRISONER TERMS 13 (2012); MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: PRISON POPU-
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sentencing guidelines, increased maximum sentences, mandatory
minimum terms, consecutive sentencing, habitual offender en-
hancement, and parole and early release provisions. The reality is
that it is much easier for legislators to increase a penalty than de-
crease it, but the cumulative effect of incremental increases in
penalties over the course of forty years has led to recognition that
Michigan is in dire need of comprehensive sentencing reform.
In January 2013, Governor Rick Snyder, Senate Majority Leader
Randy Richardville, and House Speaker Jase Bolger requested assis-
tance from the Council of State Governments (CSG) to work with
the Michigan Law Review Commission to review Michigan’s sen-
tencing, prison, and parole systems and make recommendations for
reform.2 According to Public Act 9 of 2013, the state would contract
with CSG “to continue its review of Michigan’s sentencing guide-
lines and practices, including, but not limited to, studying length of
prison stay and parole board discretion.”3
The current interest in sentencing reform is not surprising. The
Governor expressed the need for “smart justice” in preventing
crime,4 and some have questioned whether Michigan is headed in
the right direction when it comes to punishment and the use of its
finite resources. Recent reports place Michigan among the top
states in terms of average minimum length of prison stay.5 Even by
internal comparisons within the Michigan system, the trend has
been to increase penalties over time with the average sentence
length nearly doubling from 1990 to 2009.6 Not surprisingly, Michi-
gan’s prison population has soared dramatically, moving from
2. See Letter from Rick Snyder, Governor, to Marshall Clement, Dir., Council of State
Gov’ts Justice Ctr. (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://council.legislature.mi.gov/files/mlrc/
MI_Introductory_Presentation_5_22_13.pdf.
3. Act of Mar. 27, 2013, No. 9, 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts.
4. RICK SNYDER & JOHN E. NIXON, STATE BUDGET OFFICE, EXECUTIVE BUDGET: FISCAL
YEARS 2014 AND 2015, at A-9 (2013), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/
budget/1_410735_7.pdf.
5. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 13, 16 (reporting that, in 2009, the national
average was 2.9 years while Michigan averaged 4.3 years).
6. According to the Pew study, the average minimum length of stay for all Michigan
offenders was 2.4 years in 1990 but 4.3 years in 2009. Id. at 13. For violent offenders in
Michigan, the average minimum length of stay was 3.9 years in 1990 but 7.6 years in 2009. Id.
at 16. There were only four other states that approached Michigan’s number for violent
offenders in 2009: Alabama, New York, and Virginia all averaged 6.0 years, and Hawaii aver-
aged 6.2 years. Id. at 16.
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9,079 in 1970 to 43,000 prisoners by the end of 2012.7 The Michi-
gan Department of Corrections’ budget, the source of continuing
concern, has risen to a current level of two billion dollars per year.8
The explosion in rates of incarceration over the past forty years is
perplexing given Michigan’s early history of progressive sentencing
practices. In 1838, Michigan completely eliminated debtor’s prison,
and it imprisoned very few of its debtors before then.9 Michigan was
also the first state to abolish the death penalty in 184610 and one of
the very first states to move to the modern, rehabilitative model of
sentencing via use of the indeterminate sentence in 1869.11 Addi-
tionally, Michigan pioneered one of the first parole systems in the
country in 1885.12
Of course, times change, and attitudes toward crime change with
the times. In the 1920s, a serious increase in crime resulted in the
enactment of mandatory sentences for repeat offenders.13 Likewise,
in 1978 the Legislature enacted harsh penalties for violation of the
drug laws to deal with the “severe” drug problem in Michigan.14
Ultimately, these laws were repealed, but it took more than twenty
years to do so.15 What follows is an examination of penalty increases
in the last several decades, as Michigan has moved to longer prison
sentences and a larger prison population. This Article explores, in
discrete sections, increased sentence length resulting from amend-
ments to the sentencing guidelines, legislative revisions of
maximum penalties, increased authority for consecutive sentenc-
ing, and several new and harsh mandatory minimum terms. The
7. THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 171 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. Hershock, eds.,
2006); MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 1, at 1.
8. SNYDER & NIXON, supra note 4, at B-23.
9. 1 WILLIS FREDERICK DUNBAR, MICHIGAN THROUGH THE CENTURIES 233 (1955). In 1824
and again in 1834, not a single person in the whole territory was in jail for crime or debt. 2 id.
at 606.
10. In 1846, Michigan was the first state to abolish the death penalty except for the
crime of treason. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 338 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
11. 2 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 611; see Marvin Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indetermi-
nate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV 45, 53 (1978). Michigan’s first indeterminate sentence law was
enacted in 1899 and struck down in 1891. People v. Cummings, 50 N.W. 310 (Mich. 1891).
Michigan voters amended the constitution in November 1902 to provide for indeterminate
sentencing, and the first indeterminate sentence law took effect in 1903. Act of May 21, 1903,
No. 136, 1903 Mich. Pub. Acts 168; In re Campbell, 101 N.W. 826 (Mich. 1904). There was
also a 1905 indeterminate sentence act. Act of June 7, 1905, No. 184, 1905 Mich. Pub. Acts
268; Ex parte Richards, 114 N.W. 348 (Mich. 1907).
12. 2 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 611; People v. Moore, 29 N.W. 80 (Mich. 1886).
13. People v. Palm, 223 N.W. 67 (Mich. 1929); People v. Stoudemire, 414 N.W.2d 693
(Mich. 1987); see also 1 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 424; 2 id. at 608.
14. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 888 (Mich. 1992).
15. People v. Preleigh, 54 N.W.2d 599 (Mich. 1959) (repeal of habitual offender
mandatory terms); People v. Doxey, 687 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing 2002
repeal of drug mandatory minimum terms).
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Article also addresses longer prison stays due to more conservative
parole practices and policies. Historical punishments and parole
practices are offered as a basis for context and comparison. The
Article concludes that without aggressive reform, Michigan’s persis-
tent course toward even harsher sentences and longer prison
commitments will likely continue into the indefinite future.
I. CUMULATIVE INCREASES TO THE STATUTORY
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
To its credit, the Michigan Legislature attempted comprehensive
sentencing reform in 1998 when it enacted the statutory sentencing
guidelines with the aid of a nineteen-member sentencing commis-
sion.16 These guidelines were unprecedented in that they reflected
policy concerns of the Legislature and the broad-based sentencing
commission, and there was an attempt to formulate a cohesive plan
that considered the seriousness of the crime and the impact on
prison resources.17 However, the sentencing commission was dis-
banded in 2002,18 and the Legislature returned thereafter to a
piecemeal approach to criminal punishment. Had Michigan re-
tained the sentencing commission, it could have monitored
changes in crime patterns and prison usage and effected modifica-
tions to the guidelines that would have considered discrete
problems in light of the overall sentencing scheme. Unfortunately,
that opportunity was lost, and the past fifteen years have shown doz-
ens of increases in minimum and maximum penalties, as discussed
below, with little apparent effort to harmonize the penalty system as
a whole.
The history of the statutory sentencing guidelines begins in 1978
when the Michigan State Court Administrative Office received a
grant to review Michigan’s sentencing practices and develop pro-
posed sentencing guidelines.19 The four-member Michigan Felony
Sentencing Project produced a report in 1979, and the Michigan
Supreme Court adopted the proposed judicial sentencing guide-
lines in 1983.20
16. Act of July 28, 1998, No. 317, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1274.
17. See PAUL L. MALONEY ET AL., REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SENTENCING GUIDELINES COM-
MISSION 3 (1997).
18. Act of Mar. 7, 2002, No. 31, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 68, 74 (repealing MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 769.32 (1979)).
19. MARTIN ZALMAN ET AL., SENTENCING IN MICHIGAN: REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN FELONY
SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (1979).
20. People v. Broden, 408 N.W.2d 789, 792–93 (Mich. 1987); People v. Coles, 339
N.W.2d 440, 452 n.31 (Mich. 1983).
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The sentencing landscape before this first set of guidelines was
fairly unstructured. The Legislature set the maximum penalty for a
crime, and the trial judge determined the sentence within the pa-
rameters set by statute.21 For most crimes, the trial judge exercised
discretion as to the minimum sentence only and could choose be-
tween a probationary sentence and a prison term.22 There was
virtually no appellate review of sentencing decisions until 1983, and
even then sentences could not be reversed unless they “shocked the
conscience” of the court.23 Due to considerable disparity and dis-
crimination in the state’s sentencing practices,24 and spurred on by
massive prison rioting in 1981,25 the Michigan Supreme Court pro-
posed judicial sentencing guidelines to the state’s trial judges to be
used on a voluntary basis in 1983.26
The judicial sentencing guidelines were not policy-based but re-
flected the actual sentencing practices of the state’s judges.27 The
guidelines applied only to the most common felony offenses, and
the recommended ranges applied to the minimum sentence
alone.28 Consideration of the recommended ranges became
mandatory in 1984, but the Michigan Supreme Court never de-
manded compliance with the ranges.29 A second edition of the
guidelines took effect in 1988, although, like the first edition, it did
not apply to all felony offenses and excluded probation violators
and habitual offenders.30
During the early 1980s, the Michigan Legislature formed a bi-
partisan committee to consider legislative sentencing guidelines,
but the Legislature could not reach a consensus until it passed 1994
Public Act 445, which established the framework for the current
statutory guidelines and authorized a sentencing commission to de-
velop those guidelines.31 In the meantime, the Michigan Supreme
Court developed a proportionality test for review of criminal
21. In re Southard, 298 N.W. 457, 458 (Mich. 1941); Coles, 339 N.W.2d at 440, 448.
22. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.1(1) (West 2007).
23. Coles, 339 N.W.2d at 452.
24. Broden, 408 N.W.2d at 792–93.
25. Coles, 339 N.W.2d at 451 n.26.
26. Id. at 452 n.31.
27. People v. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d 1, 11–12 (Mich. 1990); see also Sheila Robertson
Deming, Michigan’s Sentencing Guidelines, 79 MICH. B.J. 652, 652–53 (2000) (discussing how
the guidelines passed in 1998 were policy-based, unlike the guidelines that preceded them).
28. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d at 13.
29. Mich. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order 1984-1, 418 Mich. at lxxx (1984); Mich. Sup. Ct. Ad-
min. Order 1985-2, 420 Mich. at lxii (1985); People v. Hegwood, 636 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich.
2001).
30. MICHIGAN SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2d ed. 1988); Paul L. Maloney, The Michigan
Sentencing Guidelines, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 13, 17 (1999); Deming, supra note 27, at 652.
31. Maloney, supra note 30, at 16.
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sentences in 1990.32 The proportionality test, which stated that
sentences should be proportionate to the severity of the crime and
the background of the offender, used the judicial sentencing guide-
lines as the “best barometer” of the appropriate punishment.33
From early 1995 to late 1997, the nineteen-member sentencing
commission met thirty-one times as it worked to develop the statu-
tory sentencing guidelines.34 The commission, composed of all the
important stakeholders in the Michigan criminal justice system,35
was tasked with developing guidelines that would treat crimes of
violence more severely than other crimes,36 consider prison re-
sources,37 incorporate intermediate sanctions as a means of keeping
low-level offenders out of the prison system,38 and apply to all fel-
ony offenses including habitual offenders.39 Sentences were to be
“proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender’s
prior criminal record.”40
The new statutory sentencing guidelines took effect on January 1,
199941 and addressed more than 700 felony offenses.42 The guide-
lines provided presumptive sentencing ranges with a strict
departure standard.43 The legislation was part of a broader restruc-
turing of sentencing that included revisions to the dollar threshold
for property offenses and elimination of disciplinary credits for
good behavior by prisoners, although these latter two changes were
made by the Legislature without input from the sentencing
commission.44
Despite these initial efforts at comprehensive sentencing reform,
the Legislature repealed the authority for the sentencing commis-
sion in 2002.45 This was done over public objection that the
Legislature was ill-suited to conduct the continuing research and
32. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d at 9–11.
33. Id. at 11–12.
34. Maloney, supra note 30, at 19; Deming, supra note 27, at 652; MALONEY ET AL., supra
note 17, at 3–5.
35. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.32 (West 2000) (repealed 2002).
36. Id. § 769.33(1)(e)(ii) (repealed 2002).
37. § 769.33(2) (repealed 2002).
38. § 769.33(1)(e)(v), (3) (repealed 2002).
39. Maloney, supra note 30, at 18; Deming, supra note 27, at 653.
40. § 769.33(1)(e)(iii) (repealed 2002).
41. Id. § 769.34(1) (West 2006).
42. Act of July 18, 1998, No. 317, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1274 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 769.31–.34, 777.1–.69).
43. § 769.34.
44. See Act of July 28, 1998, No. 311, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1222 (changing dollar thresh-
olds); Act of July 28, 1998, No. 312, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1261 (eliminating disciplinary
credits).
45. Act of Mar. 7, 2002, No. 31, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 68, 74 (repealing MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 769.32–.33).
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study necessary to support the guidelines and that legislatures often
tend “to reflect current public thought (or fears) when amending
penal laws [rather] than . . . sound research in adopting a course of
action most likely to deter crime and safely reduce prison over-
crowding.”46 In a 2008 study of the then ten-year-old Michigan
sentencing guidelines, the Council of State Governments similarly
remarked that “[s]ome of the challenges facing the Michigan sys-
tem might have been avoided through closer monitoring [via a
guidelines commission].”47
From 1999 through 2013, while operating without a sentencing
commission, the Legislature passed dozens of laws that increased
maximum penalties and increased the sentencing guidelines
ranges, either through increased scoring of the variables or by mov-
ing offenses to higher crime classifications.48 There were few
notable reductions in criminal punishment.49 Considered in total,
the increased penalties appear to have been made without refer-
ence to the proportionality principle that “discrete crime
classifications [should] make sense when matched against one an-
other.”50 The result is that stealing from a store is now treated more
46. SENTENCING GUIDELINES REVISIONS & REPEAL SENTENCING COMM’N, HOUSE LEGISLA-
TIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, SECOND ANALYSIS: HOUSE BILL 5392 AS ENROLLED 3–4 (2002).
47. Id.
48. See infra Parts I.A–C, II.
49. There were four notable reductions in criminal penalties from 1998 forward. The
first occurred contemporaneously with enactment of the sentencing guidelines when the
legislature increased the dollar threshold for a number of property crimes. Where the thresh-
old between a felony and misdemeanor offense had been one hundred dollars, it was now
1,000 dollars. See Act No. 311, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1222–35. A similar change was made in
1957 when the dollar threshold was increased from fifty dollars to one hundred dollars for
felony offenses. See Act of May 21, 1957, No. 69, 1957 Mich. Pub. Acts 74, 75.
The second change likewise occurred contemporaneously with enactment of the sentenc-
ing guidelines. The sentencing commission had recommended a set of ranges for each crime
class, and the legislature adopted those ranges with one important exception. Many of the
ranges for the Class E through H grids were relaxed at the bottom of the range to offer more
sentencing discretion to the trial judge. Maloney, supra note 30, at 21.
The third change occurred in 2002, four years after the guidelines were passed, when the
Legislature revised the drug laws to eliminate most mandatory minimum terms, provide for
early parole eligibility for those previously sentenced to a mandatory minimum term, remove
some consecutive sentencing provisions and substitute discretionary consecutive sentencing
for others, increase the weight thresholds for the more serious drug offenses, and remove
mandatory life penalties. Act of Dec. 25, 2002, No. 665, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 2455.
The fourth change occurred in 2006 when the legislature amended the kidnapping stat-
ute to provide for a form of non-aggravated kidnapping that would be called unlawful
imprisonment and would be punishable by a maximum term of fifteen years imprisonment
rather than life or any term of years, which was the previous penalty. Act of May 26, 2006, No.
160, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 475 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.349b). Aggravated kid-
napping remained a Class A offense under the sentencing guidelines, but unlawful
imprisonment became a Class C offense. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.16q (West 2006).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, at xxxiv (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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seriously than assault with a dangerous weapon,51 and obtaining
money by false pretense is punished the same as breaking into a
home while armed with a weapon.52 Several crimes that were mid-
level offenses in the past are now punishable by up to life imprison-
ment,53 and several low-level offenses have moved to the mid-level
category (e.g., retail fraud, see below).54 There has been virtually no
movement in a downward direction for recommended sentences.
A. Amendments to Maximum Penalty and Crime Classification
Incremental increases in penalty under the statutory sentencing
guidelines are best understood by reference to changes in crime
classification within the guidelines, which in turn lead to higher
recommended ranges. The guidelines’ scheme places each felony
offense into a crime class, and that crime class determines the
range of allowable punishment (a range that applies to the mini-
mum sentence only). There are nine crime classifications that move
in descending order of severity and correspond roughly to the vari-
ous maximum terms in Michigan, i.e., from second-degree murder
with its own classification (M2 class, life maximum penalty), to Class
A crimes (generally with a life maximum penalty), to Class B crimes
(generally with a twenty-year maximum penalty), to Class C crimes
(fifteen-year maximum penalty), to Class D (ten years), Class E (five
years), Class F (four years), and Class G and H (two years).55 While
the guidelines’ crime classification and the statutory maximum pen-
alty do not always match (there are some notable exceptions where
the maximum penalty varies from the crime classification),56 the
crime classification will always determine the recommended range
51. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.356c (West 2004) (retail fraud first-degree, five year
maximum penalty); id. § 750.82 (assault with a dangerous weapon, four year maximum
penalty).
52. Id. § 750.218 (West Supp. 2013) (false pretenses over 100,000 dollars, twenty year
maximum penalty); id. § 750.110a (West 2004) (home invasion first-degree, twenty year max-
imum penalty).
53. See, e.g., id. § 750.529a (theft of car through force); id. § 750.136b(2) (West Supp.
2013) (first-degree child abuse); id. § 750.72(3) (arson of dwelling).
54. See, e.g., id. § 750.81(4) (West Supp. 2013) (domestic violence third offense); id.
§ 750.356c (West 2004) (retail fraud first-degree).
55. Deming, supra note 27, at 653; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 777.61–.69 (West
2006).
56. For example, bank robbery has a life maximum penalty, but it is a Class C offense.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.531, 777.16y (West 2006). Criminal sexual conduct in the
third-degree has a fifteen-year maximum penalty, but it is a Class B offense. Id. §§ 750.520d,
777.16y. Forgery has a fourteen-year maximum penalty, but it is a Class E offense. Id.
§§ 750.248, 777.16n.
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of punishment for the minimum sentence, and that range will be
higher for more serious crimes and lower for less serious crimes.57
As indicated above, the recommended range of sentence always
increases as the crime class increases. For the baseline offender who
has no prior record and no aggravating offense characteristics, the
recommended range is zero to one month imprisonment for a
Class H offense.58 That same offender faces a range of 21 to 35
months imprisonment for a Class A offense,59 and 90 to 150 months
imprisonment for second degree murder.60 These ranges, of
course, apply only to the minimum sentence. In the fifteen years
since passage of the statutory sentencing guidelines, the Legislature
has moved several crimes to higher crime classes and at the same
time increased the statutory maximum penalty for most of these
crimes. This Section discusses the most important of those changes
as they relate to increased minimum sentences (via changes in
crime class and changes to the scoring of the variables) and in-
creased maximum sentences (via legislative revision of the
maximum penalty).
In any sentencing scheme, moving a crime to a life-maximum
penalty is significant. Twice, the Michigan Legislature has increased
crimes that were previously classified as mid-level offenses under
the Michigan sentencing guidelines to the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment with a corresponding increase in the sentencing
guidelines crime class. To do this once would be notable, but to do
it twice is a significant change, especially as there were only eight
crimes with a life-maximum penalty under the judicial sentencing
guidelines.61
Arson is one of the two crimes that the Legislature moved to the
life-maximum penalty category. Arson of a dwelling was punishable
by a twenty-year maximum penalty and a Class B designation when
the guidelines first took effect in 1999.62 As of 2013, arson of a
dwelling (now called second-degree arson, referring to arson of a
single unit dwelling without physical injury) continues to be punish-
able by a twenty-year maximum penalty and Class B designation.63
57. MALONEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 2; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 777.61–.69
(West 2006).
58. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.69.
59. Id. § 777.62.
60. Id. § 777.61.
61. MICHIGAN SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at 11–22.
62. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.72 (West 2004); id. § 777.16c (West 2006).
63. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.73 (West Supp. 2013); id. § 777.16c (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Act 169).
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However, first-degree arson, a brand new category, has a life maxi-
mum penalty and a Class A designation.64
Child abuse was the second crime to move to the life-maximum
penalty category. Before 1988, child abuse was punishable by a four-
year maximum penalty.65 In 1988, the penalties ranged from one to
fifteen years imprisonment.66 In 1999, when the guidelines took ef-
fect, first-degree child abuse was punishable by a fifteen-year
maximum penalty and a Class C designation. In 2000, the Legisla-
ture moved it to a Class B designation.67 In 2012, the maximum
penalty was increased to life imprisonment, and the crime was
moved to a Class A offense.68
The Legislature also undertook a series of important changes to
the sentencing guidelines when it moved a number of property
crimes into higher crime classes and also increased the maximum
penalty for these crimes. Before 1998, property crimes were distin-
guished in severity by maximum penalty, but there was also a dollar
threshold that separated the felony-level offense from the misde-
meanor-level offense for some property crimes.69 If the value of
property stolen was less than one hundred dollars, the crime was a
misdemeanor; if the value was over one hundred dollars, the crime
was a felony.70 The maximum penalty for the felony offense de-
pended on the severity of the crime (not simply the dollar amount)
and could vary from four to ten years imprisonment.71
In 1998, the Legislature revised the dollar threshold to 1,000 dol-
lars for the felony-level offense, but it left intact the various
maximum penalties that ranged from four- to ten-years imprison-
ment.72 However, from 1999 forward, the Legislature put in place
64. Id. § 750.72 (West Supp. 2013); id. § 777.16c (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 169).
In the 1800s, arson of a dwelling was punishable by life or any term of years, People v. Bur-
ridge, 58 N.W. 319, 319 (Mich. 1894), but the penalty was reduced to a maximum of twenty
years sometime in the first half of the twentieth century. See People v. Losinger, 50 N.W.2d
137, 143 (Mich. 1951). However, as of 2013, the maximum penalty for arson of a multiunit
dwelling or arson of a building or structure or real property resulting in physical injury is now
life imprisonment. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.72 (West Supp. 2013).
65. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.136 (1979) (repealed 1988).
66. Id. § 750.136b (1988).
67. Act of July 7, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16g).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b (West Supp. 2013); id. § 777.16g.
69. See, e.g., id. § 750.356 (West 1991).
70. Id.
71. For example, the maximum penalty for malicious destruction of property over one
hundred dollars was four years imprisonment, the maximum penalty for larceny over one
hundred dollars was five years imprisonment, and the maximum penalty for false pretenses
and embezzlement over one hundred dollars was ten years imprisonment. See id. §§ 750.380,
.356, .218, .174 (West 1979).
72. Act of July 28, 1998, No. 311, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1222.
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multiple increases to the maximum penalty, and at the same time
increased the recommended range for the minimum sentence by
moving crimes to a higher crime classification when the crime in-
volved a large sum of money. These changes were put in place for
several common property crimes.
When the sentencing guidelines first took effect in 1999, both
embezzlement by an agent over 1,000 dollars and false pretenses
over 1,000 dollars were property offenses with a ten-year maximum
penalty and a Class D and E designation, respectively.73 In October
of 2000, both offenses were reduced to a five-year maximum pen-
alty if the value of property obtained was between 1,000 dollars and
20,000 dollars, and both were considered Class E offenses.74 How-
ever, in 2006, the penalty for embezzlement was increased to ten
years if the value was 20,000 dollars to 50,000 dollars, to fifteen
years if the value was 50,000 dollars to 100,000 dollars, and to
twenty years if the value was over 100,000 dollars.75 The crime classi-
fications were also increased to Class D, C, and B, respectively.76
In 2011, a similar set of changes was put into effect for false pre-
tenses, although the maximum penalties became fifteen, fifteen,
and twenty years imprisonment for the same values as embezzle-
ment.77 The crime classes increased to Class C (for a crime
involving 20,000 dollars to 50,000 dollars), Class C (50,000 dollars
to 100,000 dollars) and Class B (over 100,000 dollars).78 In sum, for
both offenses the maximum penalty increased to twenty years im-
prisonment, and both offenses moved from the Class E range to as
high as a Class B range when the amount stolen exceeded 100,000
dollars.
With similar concern for property destruction crimes involving
large sums of money, the Legislature increased the penalties for
malicious destruction of property. In 1998, the penalty for mali-
cious destruction of personal property or a building was four years
73. While the dollar threshold increased to 1,000 dollars on January 1, 1999, there was a
ten-month lag in correcting the guidelines in terms of the offense title. As a result, the origi-
nal version of the guidelines referred to these crimes as embezzlement by agent over one
hundred dollars and larceny by false pretenses over one hundred dollars, and the title of the
offenses was not amended until October 1, 2000. Act of July 7, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich.
Pub. Acts 1079, 1108, 1111 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP LAWS §§ 777.16i, .16l).
74. Id.; see also Act of July 28, 1998, No. 312, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1236, 1242–43,
1248–49 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.174, .218).
75. Act of Dec. 30, 2006, No. 573, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 2116 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.174, 777.16i).
76. Id.
77. Act of Oct. 20, 2011, No. 201, 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.218); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.16l (West Supp. 2013).
78. § 777.16l.
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imprisonment.79 In 1999, the Legislature increased the penalty to
five years imprisonment if the value of property was 1,000 dollars to
20,000 dollars and to ten years imprisonment if the value of prop-
erty was 20,000 dollars or more.80 The crime class in 1999 was G for
destruction of personal property and F for destruction of a build-
ing.81 In 2000, the Legislature increased both crime classes to E if
the value was over 1,000 dollars and to D when the value was over
20,000 dollars.82 Again, the overall result shows an increase in maxi-
mum penalty (from four to ten years) and increase in crime class
(from Class G/F to Class D for the over 20,000 dollars category).
In a similar manner, the Legislature increased the penalty and
crime classification for both larceny and receiving and concealing
stolen property for crimes involving large financial losses. In 1999,
larceny over 1,000 dollars and receiving and concealing stolen
property over 1,000 dollars were Class E offenses punishable by a
maximum term of five years imprisonment.83 In 2000, both were
divided into Class D and E designations depending on whether the
value was 1,000 dollars to 20,000 dollars (Class E) or 20,000 dollars
and higher (Class D). The maximum penalty remained at five years
imprisonment for the lower amount but increased to ten years im-
prisonment when the value was 20,000 dollars or higher.84
Apart from increasing penalties for property crimes, the Legisla-
ture increased the maximum penalty and crime classification for
two miscellaneous crimes, the second containing an unusual twist.
First, in 1999, escape from jail through assault was punishable by a
four-year maximum penalty and a Class F designation.85 In 2006,
the penalty increased to five years imprisonment, and the crime
classification moved to Class E.86 Similarly, in 2005 the Legislature
79. Id. §§ 750.377a, .380 (West 1991).
80. Act of July 28, 1998, No. 311, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1222, 1228–30 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 750.377a, .380).
81. Act of July 28, 1998, No. 317, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1274, 1309–10 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16s).
82. Act of July 7, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079, 1115–16 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16s).
83. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 777.16r, .16z (West 2000).
84. Act No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1114–15, 1120–21; see also Act of July 28, 1998,
No. 311, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1222, 1223, 1233–34 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 750.356, .535).
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.197c, 777.16j (West 2004).
86. Act of Dec. 28, 2006, No. 535, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 2022 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.197c, 777.16j).
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created the crime of identity theft and provided for a five-year maxi-
mum penalty and a Class E designation.87 As of 2011, however, a
second violation is punishable by a ten-year maximum penalty and
a Class D designation, and a third violation is punishable by a fif-
teen-year maximum penalty and a Class C designation.88 The
increased penalties for identify theft were unusual as the Legisla-
ture bypassed traditional habitual offender increases of fifty percent
(one and one-half times) for a second felony offense and one-hun-
dred percent (double) for a third offense, instead doubling and
tripling the penalty for a second and third violation.89
Additionally, in the last set of changes to the statutory sentencing
guidelines, the Legislature moved two very common low-level of-
fenses to the mid-level category with a significant increase in the
maximum penalty and crime class. Domestic violence third offense
was punishable by a two-year maximum penalty and a Class G desig-
nation in 1999.90 As of 2013, it is punishable by a five-year
maximum penalty and a Class E designation.91 For first-degree re-
tail fraud, the change is even more significant. When first enacted
in 1988, retail fraud first-degree was punishable by a two-year maxi-
mum penalty with no sentencing guidelines.92 The crime was
created in an effort to treat shoplifters less severely than those who
violated other larceny laws, and the retail fraud statutes expressly
precluded conviction of the higher crime of larceny in a building
(with a four-year maximum penalty).93 Yet, the maximum penalty
for retail fraud first-degree increased from two to five years impris-
onment in 1998.94 Additionally, when the statutory sentencing
guidelines took effect in 1999, the crime class was Class H.95 In
87. Identity Theft Protection Act, No. 452, 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 1856, 1857–58 (codi-
fied as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.65, .69); Act of Dec. 22, 2004, No. 457, 2004
Mich. Pub. Acts 1870, 1871 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.14h).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.69 (West 2011); id. § 777.14h (West Supp. 2013).
89. Id. § 769.10, .11 (West 2000).
90. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, No. 64, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 268 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.81). Note that this crime did not exist until 1994 and was previously
misdemeanor assault. Id.
91. Act of Dec. 14, 2012, No. 365, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 165 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 777.16d, 750.81(4)).
92. Act of Feb. 17, 1988, No. 20, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 34 (codified as amended at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.356c).
93. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.356c–.356d (West 2004).
94. See Act of July 28, 1998, No. 311, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1222, 1224 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.356c).
95. Act of July 28, 1998, No. 317, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1274, 1309 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16r).
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2000, the crime class was increased three levels to Class E.96 Mean-
while, larceny in a building continues to be treated as a Class G
offense with a four-year maximum penalty.97 In other words, retail
fraud first-degree is now treated more seriously than larceny in a
building even though the 1988 Legislature intended the opposite
result.
As reflected above, the Legislature increased both the maximum
penalty and the sentencing guidelines range for a dozen offenses
from 1999 to 2013—but it went further. It increased the sentencing
guidelines range for six additional crimes without any amendment
to the maximum penalty. In other words, with no realignment of
the offense in comparison to other offenses, the Legislature dis-
agreed with the deliberate work of the sentencing commission and
increased the recommended sentence range for a number of
crimes with no corresponding increase in the maximum penalty. In
1999, criminal sexual conduct third-degree was punishable by a fif-
teen-year maximum penalty and a Class C designation.98 In 2000,
the Legislature moved it to a Class B designation.99 In the same
year, the Legislature moved perjury in a capital case up five levels
from a Class G to a Class B offense. It also moved perjury in a non-
capital case five levels from Class G to a Class C designation, as well
as moving subordination of perjury up two levels from a Class E to a
Class C offense.100 More recently, it moved fleeing and eluding first-
degree from a Class C to a Class B designation and moved fleeing
and eluding second-degree from a Class D to a Class C
designation.101
Overall, review of the sentencing guidelines scheme from 1999 to
2013 shows significant repositioning of offenses into higher crime
classifications, often with corresponding increases to the statutory
maximum penalty.
B. Amendments to Variables that Now Permit Greater Point Assessments
In addition to increasing the crime class and maximum penalty
for many common crimes, the Legislature amended the language
96. Act of July 7, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079, 1114 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16r).
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.16r (West 2006).
98. Id. § 777.16y (West 2000).
99. Act of July 7, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079, 1120 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16y).
100. Id. at 1118 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.16v).
101. Act of Oct. 9, 2012, No. 323, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 143 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 777.16x).
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of the prior record and offense variables so that more points could
be assessed for each crime. The prior record variables capture the
offender’s prior record, while the offense variables capture the ag-
gravating facts of the offense.102 The combination of these two
scores, when placed within the appropriate grid determined by the
crime class, produces a recommended range of punishment for the
minimum sentence.103
Prior Record Variables (PRV) 1 through 4, which include prior
high and low severity felony convictions and juvenile adjudications,
were amended in 2007 to allow an assessment of points for federal
and out-of-state convictions and adjudications that do not corre-
spond to a Michigan offense.104 Previously, a prior conviction or
adjudication that did not correspond to a Michigan offense could
not be scored. In addition to expanding the range of scorable of-
fenses, the new language authorized an assessment of points under
PRV 2 (prior low severity felony convictions) for prior felony-fire-
arm convictions.105 This change may have been inadvertent, as
felony-firearm convictions were never considered under the guide-
lines scheme in the past.106 However, as of 2007, felony-firearm
convictions fall within the amended language of PRV 2.107
Prior Record Variable 4 considers prior low severity felony-level
juvenile adjudications and was amended in 2000 to reduce the
number of adjudications needed for each point assessment.108 In
1999, the variable permitted twenty points for six adjudications, ten
points for four or five adjudications, five points for two or three
adjudications, and two points for one adjudication.109 In 2000, the
Legislature added a fifteen-point category (for five adjudications),
revised the ten-point category (to include three and four adjudica-
tions, rather than four or five), and revised the five-point category
(to include two adjudications, rather than two or three
adjudications).110
102. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.31(c)–(d) (West 2006).
103. Id. § 777.21 (West Supp. 2013).
104. Act of Jan. 8, 2007, No. 655, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 2312, 2325–27 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 777.51–.54).
105. See, e.g., People v. Williams, No. 288704, 2010 WL 4671107, at *7–8 (Mich. Ct. App.
Nov. 18, 2010) (per curiam); People v. Dent, No. 290832, 2010 WL 3656028, at *6–7 (Mich.
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2010) (per curiam).
106. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.57(2)(d) (West 2006) (felony-firearm does not
count under PRV 7); id. § 777.42 (felony-firearm does not count under OV 12).
107. See Williams, 2010 WL 4671107, at *7–8.
108. Act of Oct. 1, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079, 1127 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.54).
109. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.54 (West 2000).
110. Act No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1127.
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Prior Record Variable 5 considers prior misdemeanor convic-
tions and adjudications.111 This variable was amended in 2000 to
broaden the range of scorable weapons offenses.112 When the
guidelines were first enacted in 1998, the variable encompassed
misdemeanor weapons offenses that were enumerated in Mich.
Comp. Laws 750.222 to 750.239a. In 2000, the variable included all
misdemeanor weapons offenses.113
The offense variables received similar increases by legislative
amendment. Offense Variables (OV) 1 and 2 are designed to ad-
dress the aggravated use of a weapon and type of weapon,
respectively.114 These variables were amended in 2001 and 2002 to
add harmful biological and chemical devices to the range of possi-
ble weapons used during an offense.115
Offense Variable 3 (physical injury) was amended in 2000 to pro-
vide an assessment of thirty-five points if death resulted from an
intoxicated driving offense, and that assessment was increased to
fifty points in 2003.116 Previously, zero, or at best twenty-five points,
could be scored for a drunk driving offense that resulted in the
death of the victim.117
Offense Variables 5 (serious psychological harm to victim’s fam-
ily) and Offense Variable 6 (intent to kill or injure) were amended
in 2000 to include attempted homicide and assault with intent to
murder crimes.118 These variables were amended again in 2002 to
include both conspiracy and solicitation to commit homicide.119 In
effect, these two variables, which were designed to apply to homi-
cide offenses and to consider the effect of the crime (OV 5) and the
offender’s intent during the crime (OV 6), now apply to attempts
and early efforts to accomplish the homicide offense.
111. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.55 (West 2006).
112. Act No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1127–28.
113. See id.
114. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 777.31–.32 (West 2006).
115. Act of Oct. 23, 2001, No. 136, 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 1110, 1118 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 777.31–.32); Act of Apr. 22, 2002, No. 137, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 409,
410 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.31).
116. Act of Oct. 1, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079, 1125 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.33); Act of Sept. 30, 2003, No. 134, 2003 Mich. Pub. Act 386
(codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.33).
117. See People v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Mich. 2005) (holding that although
one hundred points cannot be scored under Offense Variable 3 when homicide is the sen-
tencing offense, twenty-five points can be scored for life threatening injury that occurred
before death of the victim).
118. See Act No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1124–25.
119. See Act of Apr. 1, 2002, No. 143, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 422, 423 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.22).
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Offense Variable 9 is a variable that considers the number of vic-
tims of the crime. This variable was amended in 2007 to include
victims of property crimes and financial loss.120 Previously, the defi-
nition of victim was limited to those who were placed in danger of
physical injury or loss of life.121
Offense Variable 13 is a variable that considers the pattern of
felony crimes committed over a five-year period. This variable origi-
nally had five categories ranging from zero to twenty-five points.122
The Legislature amended the variable in 2000 to add a sixth cate-
gory with fifty points when there are three or more penetrations
involving a victim under the age of thirteen.123 The variable was
again amended in 2009 to provide a seventh category, with an as-
sessment of twenty-five points, when there is gang-membership
activity.124
Offense Variables 17 and 18 are variables that relate to operation
of a vehicle at the time of the offense (whatever that offense may
be).125 Offense Variable 17 considers the degree of negligent driv-
ing and was amended in 2003 to remove the requirement that
operation of a vehicle must be an “element of the offense.”126 Now,
operation of a vehicle must have occurred, but it need not be an
element of the offense.127
Offense Variable 18 considers the offender’s blood alcohol level
while driving.128 This variable was amended in 2003 to lower the
threshold blood alcohol level for the ten- and five-point assess-
ments.129 Where the variable had previously allowed ten points for a
blood alcohol level (BAC) of .10 to .14, it now allows ten points
when the BAC is .08 to .15.130 Where it had previously allowed five
points for a BAC of .07 to .09 or where the offender was “visibly
impaired” or was an underage offender violating a zero tolerance
provision, the variable now permits five points for visibly impaired
120. Act of Mar. 30, 2006, No. 548, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 2041, 2041–42 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.39).
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.39(2)(a) (West Supp. 2013).
122. Id. § 777.43 (West 2000).
123. Act of Oct. 1, 2000, No. 279, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 1079, 1126 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.43).
124. Act of Apr. 1, 2009, No. 562, 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 264 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 777.43).
125. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.22 (West 2006).
126. Act of Sept. 30, 2003, No. 134, 2003 Mich. Pub. Acts 384, 386 (codified as amended
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.22).
127. Id.
128. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.48 (West 2006).
129. Act No. 134, 2003 Mich. Pub. Acts at 388.
130. See id.
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and underage drivers violating a zero tolerance provision (i.e., de-
leting the .07 category).131
Offense Variable 19 considers the extent of the offender’s inter-
ference with the administration of justice.132 This variable was
amended in 2001 to broaden the fifteen-point category that applied
to the offender’s use of force or threat of force in relation to the
administration of justice.133 Before 2001, fifteen points could be as-
sessed if the offender used force or threat of force to interfere with,
or attempt to interfere with, the administration of justice.134 In
2001, the Legislature amended the language so that the offender
must use force or threat of force to (1) interfere with, (2) attempt
to interfere with, or (3) act in a way “that results in” an interference
with the administration of justice.135 The Legislature also included
interference with “the rendering of emergency services” as part of
the fifteen-point category.136 In 2002, the Legislature amended the
title of the variable to include interference with the rendering of
emergency services.137 In a nutshell, the variable now covers a
broader range of conduct.
Offense Variable 20 (terrorism) was added in 2002 following the
deadly attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001.138 This variable considers acts of terrorism against a civilian
population or the government.139
In sum, the offense variables—variables designed to account for
aggravating conduct that occurs during the crime—now consider
additional aggravating conduct or score higher points for the same
conduct previously included, depending on the variable
considered.
A review of the most significant increases to the statutory sen-
tencing guidelines would be incomplete without mention of three
major court decisions that affected the scoring of two specific of-
fense variables. In People v. Houston, the Michigan Supreme Court
concluded that twenty-five points could be scored for life-threaten-
ing injury under Offense Variable 3 (the variable that considers
physical injury to a victim) in virtually any homicide case because
131. Id.
132. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.49 (West 2006).
133. See Act of Oct. 23, 2001, No. 136, 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 1110, 1119 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.49).
134. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.49 (West 2000).
135. See Act No. 136, 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1119.
136. Id.
137. Act of Apr. 22, 2002, No. 137, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 409, 411 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.49).
138. Id. at 411–12 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 777.49a).
139. Id.; People v. Osantowski, 748 N.W.2d 799 (Mich. 2008).
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life-threatening injury must necessarily have occurred before death
resulted.140 Before this decision, the assumption was that zero
points would be scored for homicide offenses.141 Then, in People v.
Laidler, the Court concluded that points could be scored under Of-
fense Variable 3 where the co-perpetrator, or even the defendant,
was injured or killed during the offense. Before this decision, there
was no authority to consider injury to the co-perpetrator or the de-
fendant.142 Finally, in People v. Hardy, the Court concluded that fifty
points could be scored under Offense Variable 7 (aggravated physi-
cal abuse) where the defendant racks the shotgun (i.e., readies it
for firing by releasing a round of ammunition into the firing cham-
ber) during a carjacking offense.143 Before this decision, the Court
of Appeals had concluded that the hefty fifty-point assessment did
not apply unless there was “egregious” conduct by the offender that
was designed to cause “copious or plentiful” amounts of additional
fear.144
C. General Impact of Sentencing Guidelines Increases
The cumulative impact of these changes in the sentencing guide-
lines is significant. On a structural level, the sentencing commission
attempted to achieve a delicate balance between sending more vio-
lent offenders to prison and keeping low-level offenders out of
prison, but the commission’s final product penalized the violent of-
fender with even higher sentences than recommended under the
judicial sentencing guidelines. For second-degree murder, the judi-
cial sentencing guidelines started with a baseline range of 12 to 84
months and ended at 240 to 480 months or life imprisonment for
the worst offender; the statutory guidelines start with a baseline of
90 to 150 months and end for the worst offender at 365 to 1200
months or life imprisonment.145 Likewise, for armed robbery, the
judicial guidelines started with a baseline of 0 to 36 months and
140. People v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 530, 533–34 (Mich. 2005). There is a provision not
to score points for the death itself. Id. at 533
141. See People v. Brown, 692 N.W.2d 717, 719–21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 704
N.W.2d 462 (Mich. 2005) (concluding that zero points should be scored under Offense Vari-
able 3 when the sentencing offense is a homicide; this was later reversed by the Michigan
Supreme Court in light of Houston).
142. People v. Laidler, 817 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Mich. 2012).
143. People v. Hardy, 835 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Mich. 2013).
144. People v. Glenn, 814 N.W.2d 686, 690, (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Hardy,
835 N.W.2d 340.
145. MICHIGAN SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at 80; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 777.61 (West 2006).
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ended at 120 to 300 months or life imprisonment; the statutory
guidelines start at 21 to 35 months and end at 270 to 900 months or
life imprisonment.146 Even for the crime of breaking and entering
an occupied dwelling (now known as home invasion), the judicial
guidelines started with a baseline of 0 to 6 months and ended at 60
to 120 months; the statutory guidelines for home invasion first-de-
gree begin at 0 to 18 months and end at 117 to 320 months.147
On another structural level, the act of moving crimes to a higher
crime class after the statutory guidelines were enacted in 1998—
particularly with no notable movement downward among crime
classes—has created a top-heavy system where the most common
crimes are bunched between Class A and Class E levels, and fewer
crimes fall into the lower levels.
The practical impact of these changes is noteworthy. When arson
of a dwelling moved from a Class B up to a Class A category in 2012
(provided there are injuries or a multi-unit building, both being
necessary for the new crime of arson in the first-degree),148 the two-
level increase elevated the baseline range from 0 to 6 months to 0
to 18 months and increased the upper range from 43 to 152
months to 117 to 320 months.149 Similarly, for domestic violence
third offense, moving the crime from Class G to Class E elevated
the baseline and upper ranges to a significant degree, but it also
had the effect of mandating a prison sentence for twenty-five per-
cent of the offenders.150 Before the move, there were no mandatory
prison sentences. Instead, forty-six percent of offenders were in
straddle cells (a cell allowing either prison or an intermediate sanc-
tion, the latter referring to a non-prison sentence),151 and fifty-four
percent of offenders were in intermediate sanction cells (again,
meaning a complete lockout from prison).152 Like domestic vio-
lence, the effect of moving first-degree retail fraud from Class H to
146. MICHIGAN SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at 102; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 777.62 (West 2006) (Class A offenses); id. § 777.16y (armed robbery is a Class A offense).
147. MICHIGAN SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at 38; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 777.63 (West 2006) (Class B offenses); id. § 777.16f (home invasion first-degree is a Class B
offense).
148. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.72 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2013, No. 119).
149. Compare id. § 777.63 (West 2006) (Class B offenses), with id. § 777.65 (Class D
offenses).
150. Compare id. § 777.66 (Class E offenses, where the grid contains nine prison cells out
of a total of thirty-six cells), with id. § 777.68 (Class G offenses, where the grid contains no
prison cells).
151. Straddle cells are cells where the upper limit of the range is more than eighteen
months and the lower limit of the range is twelve months or less. The trial court has the
choice of prison or an intermediate sanction. Id. § 769.34(4)(a), (c).
152. Compare id. § 777.66 (Class E offenses, with a third of the cells having a range of
fourteen or more months), with id. § 777.68 (Class G offenses, where a third of the cells are
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Class E meant that twenty-five percent of the offenders will now go
to prison, absent a departure, when before the amendment there
were no mandatory prison sentences, a split of twenty-nine percent
straddle cells, and seventy-one percent intermediate sanction cells
for the Class H offense.153 This stands in stark comparison to the
recommended ranges for larceny from a building, a Class G of-
fense, where there are no prison cells.154
Even an increase in the number of points assessed under the
prior record and offense variables can have a dramatic impact on
the recommended range. Based on the 2013 Hardy case, fifty points
will be assessed more frequently under Offense Variable 7,155 and
the recommended ranges will often double.156 The ranges are more
than doubled as a result of the 2003 amendment when adding fifty
points under Offense Variable 3 for drunk driving offenses result-
ing in death.157 Likewise, adding twenty-five points under Offense
Variable 3 for the life-threatening injury that must have occurred
prior to death—per the 2005 Houston case—can change the range
for a Class A offense by twenty-five percent or more.158 By way of
example, an offender who commits a Class A offense with no prior
record and who receives sixty points under the offense variables will
have a recommended range of 51 to 85 months, but the range in-
creases to 81 to 135 months if that offender is given an additional
twenty-five points under Offense Variable 3 per the Houston case.159
The steady increases in recommended sentencing ranges add up.
The compliance rate with the judicial sentencing guidelines, with
its wide-open departure policy, was approximately eighty percent.160
While there exists no official data on trial courts’ compliance with
at most a straddle cell). The sentencing guidelines require a prison sentence for cells with a
starting number of thirteen months or higher, while they allow a prison sentence or an inter-
mediate sanction for ranges where the starting number is twelve months or less. Id.
§ 769.34(4)(a)–(c).
153. Compare id. § 777.66 (Class E offenses, where the grid contains nine prison cells out
of a total of thirty-six cells), with id. § 777.69 (Class H offenses, where the grid contains no
prison cells).
154. Id. § 777.68.
155. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.62 (West 2006) (Class A offenses).
157. See id. § 777.64 (Class C offenses); id. § 777.12f (operating vehicle causing death can
be Class C offense).
158. Id. § 777.62 (Class A offenses); see also People v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 530 (Mich.
2005).
159. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.62 (Class A grid).
160. People v. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich. 1990).
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the statutory sentencing guidelines, the very strict departure stan-
dard set forth in Michigan Compiled Laws section 769.34(3) would
suggest a much higher compliance rate.161
In sum, trial judges using the new guidelines are faced with pre-
sumptive sentence ranges that have increased steadily since 1999.
Moreover, the loss of a sentencing commission was most unfortu-
nate, as legislators have acted each year under political pressure to
increase penalties for specific crimes without considering the effect
on the whole sentencing scheme. “The use of an independent com-
mission to draft presumptive sentences has two advantages: it allows
sentencing policy to be both more expertly crafted and [also] less
subject to distorting political pressures.”162 The sentencing guide-
lines of 2013 reflect the Legislature’s concern with financial crimes
and a few other discrete problems, but they lack balance as a whole
and reflect overall movement toward harsher punishment. Sentenc-
ing commissions, on the other hand, take the long view and are
able to review and revise guidelines in harmonious fashion while
also considering the effective use of future resources:
Established policies are no more self-sustaining over time than
they are self-executing at inception. Sentencing Commissions
play a vital role in quality control. They are able to discern if
sentences are harmonious with intended goals and make
targeted adjustments when necessary. Given the initial pur-
poseful and deliberative investment made by policymakers and
commissions to guide sentencing, it is worthwhile to reexam-
ine basic decision-making elements to solidify past and current
gains as well as reorient future resources in the most effective
manner.163
A comprehensive review of Michigan’s statutory sentencing
guidelines from enactment in 1998 to 2013 reveals guidelines that
have failed to evolve in a meaningful way. Instead, these guidelines
161. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.34(3) (West 2006). An informal email to the au-
thor from Marge Bossenberry, then with the Policy and Strategic Planning Administration of
the Michigan Department of Corrections, claimed an overall compliance rate of ninety-one
percent based on 2003 data. E-mail from Margaret A. Bossenberry, Policy and Strategic Plan-
ning Administration, Michigan Department of Corrections, to author (Feb. 2, 2005, 3:41 PM)
(on file with author).
162. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale G.
Parent’s Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines, 75
MINN. L. REV. 727, 729–30 (1991); Deming, supra note 27, at 654.
163. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND
FAIRNESS IN SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES 3 (2008).
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reflect the politics of criminal law: a one-way ratchet that leads to
ever-increasing penalties.164
II. INCREASING MAXIMUM SENTENCES
“[P]iecemeal legislative changes in penalties tend to produce
the evils of disproportionality in penalties and an ‘inching up’
of allowable maximum terms.”165
The previous Part looked at increases to the sentencing guide-
lines, often with contemporaneous changes in the maximum
sentence, and how those increases played out in longer recom-
mended sentencing ranges for the minimum sentence. In this Part,
increased maximum sentences are discussed without reference to
the sentencing guidelines ranges, as many of the increased penal-
ties were put into effect before the sentencing guidelines took
effect and have no connection to the sentencing guidelines ranges.
Increased maximum sentences are important, however, because
they delineate the maximum amount of time the offender may be
held in prison, serve to limit the minimum sentence (pursuant to
the two-thirds rule discussed in Part V, infra), and generally reflect
where on the continuum of most-serious to least-serious offense the
crime falls.
To a surprising extent, the maximum penalty for many common
felonies has remained the same since the 1800s. First-degree mur-
der is still punishable by mandatory life imprisonment, and second-
degree murder is still punishable by life or any term of years.166 The
penalty for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (previously known
as carnal knowledge) is still life or any term of years, and the pen-
alty for armed robbery is much the same as it was in the nineteenth
164. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND
FAIRNESS IN SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES 3 (2008).
165. ZALMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 8.
166. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 2004) (first-degree murder penalty
is life imprisonment), and id. § 750.317 (second-degree murder penalty is life or any term of
years), with People v. Repke, 61 N.W. 861, 863–64 (Mich. 1895) (noting sentence of life
imprisonment for first-degree murder), and In re Campbell, 101 N.W. 826, 827 (Mich. 1904)
(noting penalty of life or any term of years for second-degree murder).
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century.167 For less serious crimes as well, the maximum penalty has
remained remarkably consistent.168
Yet, since the mid-1970s, and particularly in the last twenty years,
the Legislature has revised the maximum penalty for a number of
crimes, occasionally reducing the penalty but more often than not
increasing it. The increases have ranged from small to large, but
they add up on a cumulative basis and change the relationship of
one crime to another.
A. Felony-Firearm (1977)
In 1977, the Legislature created the crime of possession of a fire-
arm during commission of a felony (felony-firearm).169 The
mandatory penalty was two years imprisonment for a first offense,
five years imprisonment for a second offense, and ten years impris-
onment for a third or subsequent offense.170 There was and is no
departure provision. The sentence for felony-firearm always runs
consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony offense.171
167. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(2)(a) (West Supp. 2013) (penalty of life
or any term of years for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree), and id. § 750.529 (West
2004) (penalty of life or any term of years for armed robbery), with In re Campbell, 101 N.W.
at 827–28 (holding that the maximum penalty for rape is “life or for any such period as the
court in its discretion shall direct”), People v. Scofield, 105 N.W. 610, 610 (Mich. 1905) (most
serious form of armed robbery included intent to kill or maim if victim resisted), People v.
Dumas, 125 N.W. 766, 768 (Mich. 1910) (holding that maximum penalty was life imprison-
ment or a term of years for the most serious form of armed robbery), and In re Southard, 298
N.W. 457, 460 (Mich. 1941) (holding that the maximum penalty for armed robbery was life
or any term of years).
168. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321 (West 2004) (maximum penalty of fif-
teen years imprisonment for manslaughter), id. § 750.248 (maximum penalty of fourteen
years imprisonment for forgery), id. § 750.110a(6) (maximum penalty of fifteen years impris-
onment for home invasion second-degree), id. § 750.520g(1) (maximum penalty of ten years
imprisonment for assault with intent to commit sexual penetration), and id. § 750.74(3)
(West Supp. 2013) (maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment for third-degree arson),
with People v. Cummings, 50 N.W. 310, 312 (Mich. 1891) (noting a fifteen-year maximum
penalty for manslaughter), and FRANZ C. KUHN, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 172–74 (1912) (showing a maximum penalty of fourteen years for
forgery, fifteen years for burglary, ten years for assault with intent to rape, and ten years for
burning of a barn).
169. Act of Jan. 1, 1977, No. 6, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 27 (codified as amended at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.227b).
170. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227b (West 2004).
171. Id. § 750.227b(2).
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Given the consecutive nature of the penalty, the Legislature effec-
tively increased the maximum sentence by two years for any felony
offense committed with a gun.172
B. Fleeing and Eluding (1988)
Initially, fleeing and eluding was a one-year misdemeanor of-
fense, which was added to the penal code in 1966.173 In 1988, the
misdemeanor version included a mandatory minimum term of “not
less than 30 days” and a repeat offender version that carried a
mandatory minimum term of one year and a maximum term of
four years imprisonment.174 In 1996, in what was named the Lt.
Donald Bezenah Law in honor of an officer killed in action, the
Legislature removed the mandatory minimum terms and created
four tiers with penalties ranging from two years (for fourth-degree
fleeing and eluding, the original offense), five years (third-degree
fleeing and eluding with an accident, when the speed limit was
thirty-five miles per hour or less, or with a prior conviction), ten
years (second-degree fleeing and eluding with serious injury or
prior convictions), and fifteen years (first-degree fleeing and elud-
ing resulting in death).175
In a nutshell, fleeing and eluding went from a one-year misde-
meanor in 1966 to a two-year felony offense in 1996, with
aggravating conduct increasing the penalty all the way to fifteen
years imprisonment in 1996.
C. Carjacking (1994, 2004)
For many years, stealing a car without a weapon, but with force or
violence, was considered unarmed robbery, a crime punishable by a
maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment.176 As of October
1, 1994, the Legislature increased the penalty to life or any term of
172. There are four exceptions. The statute does not apply if the underlying felony is
carrying a concealed weapon, unlawful sale of a firearm or pistol, unlawful possession of a
pistol by a licensee, or altering the identity mark on a firearm. Id. § 750.227b(1).
173. Act of Mar. 10, 1967, No. 299, 1966 Mich. Pub. Acts 509 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479a).
174. Act of Mar. 30, 1989, No. 407, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 1628, 1628–29 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479a).
175. See Act of June 1, 1996, No. 586, 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 2604, 2604–05 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479a); Liz Shepard, Bill Named in Honor of St. Clair
County Deputy, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Mich.), Dec. 2, 2011, at A.1.
176. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.530(1) (West 2004).
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years and added a consecutive sentencing provision for crimes com-
mitted during the same transaction.177 This new crime, called
“carjacking,” reflects “the Legislative intent to facilitate the prosecu-
tion of, and provide harsh penalties for, those persons who use
force to take a motor vehicle from another.”178 In 2004, the Legisla-
ture expanded the crime of carjacking to include the taking of a
vehicle when the required force is used after the crime in an effort
to flee the scene or retain possession of the vehicle.179
D. Home Invasion (1994, 1999)
On October 1, 1994, the Legislature created the crime of home
invasion.180 First-degree home invasion built upon the former crime
of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling (otherwise known
as burglary at common law) by adding the aggravating circum-
stance of a weapon or a person present in the home.181 Either
circumstance increased the maximum penalty from fifteen to
twenty years imprisonment.182 Second-degree home invasion simi-
larly replaced the former crime of breaking and entering an
occupied dwelling but continued the maximum penalty of fifteen
years imprisonment.183 The Legislature added third-degree home
invasion (essentially breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to
commit a misdemeanor) with a five-year maximum penalty in
1999.184
The end result was a five-year increase in the maximum penalty
for what was earlier known as breaking and entering an occupied
dwelling (now home invasion first-degree) where there were aggra-
vating circumstances and expansion of the crime to include
misdemeanor conduct (i.e. home invasion third-degree). In effect,
177. Act of Oct. 1, 1994, No. 191, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 820 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.529a).
178. People v. Raper, 563 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
179. Act of June 3, 2004, No. 128, 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 405, 405 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.529a).
180. Act of Oct. 1, 1994, No. 270, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 1264, 1264–65 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.110a).
181. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110a (West 2004).
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Act of Oct. 1, 1999, No. 44, 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 120, 120–21 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.110a). If the breaking and entering is done without the intent to commit a
felony or misdemeanor and no misdemeanor occurs, it is punishable as a ninety-day misde-
meanor. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.115, .504 (West 2004).
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Michigan has now moved backwards in time to the 1800s, when bur-
glary was punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment,185 and it
has expanded the crime to include misdemeanor conduct.
E. Resisting and Obstructing an Officer (2002)
In the 1931 penal code, the crime of resisting and obstructing an
officer was classified as a two-year misdemeanor.186 In 2002, the Leg-
islature added Mich. Comp. Laws section 750.81d (resisting and
obstructing a person performing duties) and amended Mich.
Comp. Laws section 750.479 (assaulting, battering, obstructing of-
ficer performing duty). This increased the underlying penalty to a
two-year felony and provided increased penalties for bodily injury
(four years), serious impairment of a body function (ten to fifteen
years), and death (twenty years).187 Both statutes also include a dis-
cretionary consecutive sentencing provision for offenses committed
during the same transaction.188
F. Criminal Sexual Conduct (Including Mandatory Lifetime
Monitoring) (2006)
In 1975, the Michigan Legislature repealed the carnal knowledge
statute and replaced it with a series of six new criminal sexual con-
duct (CSC) offenses.189 The statutory penalty for the most serious
185. It appears history may have repeated itself as the burglary statute of the 1800s ini-
tially provided for a twenty-year maximum penalty for aggravated burglary (with a weapon,
assault or person present) and a fifteen-year maximum penalty for breaking and entering an
occupied or unoccupied building at night. People v. Huffman, 23 N.W.2d 236, 236–37
(Mich. 1946); People v. Shaver, 65 N.W. 538, 538 (Mich. 1895); Harris v. People, 6 N.W. 677,
677–78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1880). The penalty for breaking and entering an unoccupied dwell-
ing or building was reduced to ten years imprisonment in 1964. Act of May 16, 1964, No. 133,
1964 Mich. Pub. Acts 126 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110); see also
People v. Poole, 151 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967). The ten-year offense has re-
mained essentially the same since 1964 and continues to be found under section 750.110.
186. Act of June 16, 1931, No. 328, 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 624, 718–19. It appears the
crime was a misdemeanor in the 1800s as well. See People v. McLean, 36 N.W. 231 (Mich.
1888). In 1989, forcibly assaulting an officer or causing bodily injury to an officer was a two-
year misdemeanor offense captured in the fleeing and eluding statute. Act of Mar. 30, 1989,
No. 407, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 1628, 1629 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.479a).
187. Act of July 15, 2002, No. 266, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 750, 751 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.81d); Act of May 9, 2002, No. 270, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 758, 759 (codified
as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479).
188. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.81d(6), .479(7) (West 2004).
189. See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, No. 266, 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts 1025, 1025–28 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520a–.520l).
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crime remained at life or any term of years, but the penalty for
statutory rape and other forms of nonconsensual conduct de-
creased to fifteen years imprisonment or less.190 Although some
penalties went down, the new CSC statutes covered a greater range
of conduct, eliminated the need to prove resistance or non-consent,
and extended protection to groups not previously covered such as
uninjured victims, prostitutes, males, and spouses.191 The legislation
also added a five-year mandatory minimum term for conviction of a
second or subsequent CSC offense.192
In August of 2006, in response to the highly publicized rape and
murder of nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford in Florida, the Legislature
increased the penalty for first-degree CSC with a victim under the
age of thirteen in two ways.193 First, the Legislature added a
mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years for an offense com-
mitted by an individual at least seventeen years old with a victim
under the age of thirteen.194 Second, the Legislature added the
penalty of mandatory life imprisonment without parole for this par-
ticular variation of first-degree CSC (offender seventeen years of
age or older, victim under the age of thirteen) when the offender
has a prior CSC conviction (any degree) involving a child under the
age of thirteen (i.e., a repeat child molester).195
Moreover, for all first-degree CSC convictions, and for second-
degree CSC convictions involving a minor under thirteen where the
offender is sentenced to prison, the Legislature added mandatory
lifetime electronic monitoring.196 Additionally, the Legislature ad-
ded a discretionary consecutive sentencing provision for first-
degree CSC convictions and the sentences for offenses arising out
of the same transaction.197
190. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b–.520g (West 2006).
191. See Note, Analysis of Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Act, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 203,
208–10 (1976).
192. Act No. 266, 1974 Mich. Public Acts at 1028.
193. Act of May 29, 2006, No. 169, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 499 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Act of May 29, 2006, No. 171, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 502, 502–05 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b–.520c, .520n) (providing for mandatory sen-
tence of lifetime electronic surveillance); Act of May 29, 2006, No. 172, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts
506, 507–08 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.285) (establishing a lifetime
electronic monitoring program); see also People v. Kern, 794 N.W.2d 362, 369 (Mich. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that lifetime monitoring does not apply for CSC second-degree unless the
offender is sentenced to prison).
197. Act No. 169, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts at 500.
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G. Impact of Increasing Maximum Sentences
In small and not so small increments, the maximum penalty has
crept up for a number of common felony crimes. For some of these
crimes, the Legislature has reverted to penalties existing in the
1800s despite the fact that the 1800s penalty had been reduced by a
subsequent legislature.198 For other crimes, the Legislature has in-
creased the statutory maximum penalty to a significant degree. The
prison population seems to mirror the changes, as the population
moved from 9,000 in 1970 to 43,000 prisoners in 2012.199
Although most inmates do not serve the maximum sentence,
some will serve a good portion of the maximum term, and others
will serve all of it. The latest published numbers for individuals who






While the above numbers are not large, the number of individu-
als who may serve a portion of these newly increased maximum
terms is more significant. According to Michigan Department of
Corrections’ statistical reports from 2009 through 2011 (2011 being
the most recent year for purposes of statistical analysis), there are
thousands of offenders sentenced each year under the increased
maximum penalties discussed above. Given current parole practices
(see Part VI, infra), many will serve some portion of the maximum
sentence (i.e., will serve time beyond the minimum sentence). The
following is a list of the average number of offenders per year sub-
ject to the new maximum terms:
• Felony-Firearm (two-year penalty): The average number of prison
commitments per year is 1,616.201
• Fleeing and Eluding Third-Degree: The average number of prison
commitments per year is 65.202
198. See supra notes 64, 185 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
200. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDERS WHO HAVE SERVED THEIR MAXIMUM SENTENCE AND
HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM PRISON, 2003–2007, at 2 tbl.A (2008).
201. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., COURT DISPOSITIONS, MDOC STATISTICAL REPORT SUPPLE-
MENT 2003–2011, at A-31, A-107, A-182 (2012) [hereinafter COURT DISPOSITIONS] (reporting
1,599 prison commitments for felony firearm in 2011, 1,664 in 2010, and 1,587 in 2009).
202. See id. at A-38, A-115, A-190 (reporting forty-nine prison commitments for third-de-
gree fleeing and eluding in 2011, sixty-eight in 2010, and seventy-seven in 2009).
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• Carjacking: The average number of prison commitments per
year for this crime—a crime that would have been unarmed
robbery before 1994—is 147.203
• Home Invasion First-Degree: The average number of prison com-
mitments per year for this crime, now with a twenty-year
maximum penalty, is 485.204
• Home Invasion Third-Degree:  The average number of prison
commitments per year for this crime, a felony offense that did
not exist until 1999, is 118.205
• Resisting an Officer: The average number of prison commit-
ments per year, reflecting a cumulative total under both
statutes, is 535.206
• Arson of a Dwelling: The average number of prison commit-
ments per year for this crime, before it became the new crime
of arson first- and second-degree, was 52.207
• Domestic Violence Third Offense: The average number of prison
commitments per year is 136.208
• Retail Fraud First-Degree: The average number of prison com-
mitments per year for this crime, with the new five-year
maximum penalty, is 301.209
In addition, 2006 amendments’ impact to the CSC laws merits
special attention. The average number of prison commitments for
CSC first-degree with an offender aged at least seventeen and a vic-
tim under the age of thirteen (with a mandatory minimum term of
twenty-five years) is sixty-nine per year.210 For the non-parolable life
203. See id. at A-41, A-118, A-192 (reporting 146 prison commitments for carjacking in
2011, 149 in 2010, and 146 in 2009).
204. See id. at A-25, A-101, A-176 (reporting 468 prison commitments for first-degree
home invasion in 2011, 517 in 2010, and 471 in 2009).
205. See id. (reporting 115 prison commitments for third-degree home invasion in 2011,
108 in 2010, and 131 in 2009).
206. For commitments under section 750.81d(1), the three-year average is 529 cases. See
id. at A-44, A-120, A-195 (reporting 560 prison commitments for resisting an officer under
750.81d(1) in 2011, 516 in 2010, and 511 in 2009). For commitments under section
750.479(2), the three-year average is six cases. See id. at A-38, A-115, A-189 (reporting seven
prison commitments for resisting an officer under 750.479(2) in 2011, eight in 2010, and two
in 2009).
207. See id. at A-43, A-119, A-194 (reporting fifty-nine prison commitments for arson
under 750.72 in 2011, forty-nine in 2010, and forty-seven in 2009).
208. See id. at A-43, A-120, A-194 (reporting 143 prison commitments for domestic vio-
lence third offense in 2011, 138 in 2010, and 128 in 2009).
209. See id. at A-35, A-111, A-186 (reporting 311 prison commitments for retail fraud first-
degree in 2011, 325 in 2010, and 268 in 2009).
210. See id. at A-40, A-117, A-191 (reporting fifty-seven prison commitments in 2011,
ninety-five in 2010, and fifty-six in 2009).
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sentence for CSC first-degree second offense, the average number
of prison commitments is three per year.211 The average number of
prison commitments for CSC second-degree with an offender aged
at least seventeen and a victim under the age of thirteen (i.e., where
there is mandatory lifetime monitoring) is fifty-nine per year.212
As of November 2013, there were forty-two individuals in the life-
time monitoring program at a cost of five dollars per day—for
equipment costs only—for each individual subject to monitoring.213
The number of monitored individuals is expected to increase signif-
icantly in the future as more offenders are released from prison and
placed into the monitoring program. Offenders who cannot pay
the daily cost of monitoring are subject to a new two-year felony
conviction.214 In addition, the state will incur costs of a minimum of
1,825 dollars per year per offender (sometimes for as long as fifty
years for each offender) when the individual cannot afford to pay.
There is no discretionary release from the monitoring program,
and the individual must be monitored “until the time of the individ-
ual’s death.”215
All told, multiple increases to the maximum penalty are signifi-
cant, costly, and tend to move the entire system of punishment into
a higher realm.
III. MANDATORY MINIMUM TERMS—A POWERFUL FEW
Mandatory minimum terms inspire a great deal of debate be-
cause the Legislature employs them to address discrete and
sometimes intractable problems of crime, but the bench and bar
generally oppose them due to the lack of an individualized
sentence.
211. See id. at A-40, A-117, A-191 (reporting three prison commitments in 2011, three in
2010, and three in 2009).
212. See id. at A-41, A-117, A-192 (reporting sixty-three prison commitments in 2011, sev-
enty-two in 2010, and forty-one in 2009).
213. The manager of the Parole/Probation Electronic Monitoring Program, Gregory L.
Roach, reported forty-two individuals as of November 19, 2013. E-mail from Gregory L.
Roach, Manager, Elec. Monitoring Ctr., to author (Nov. 19, 2013) (on file with author); see
also MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO P.A. 200 OF 2012, SEC
608, GPS ELECTRONIC TETHER PROGRAM 1 (2013). The daily cost of equipment is five dollars.
MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Lifetime Electronic Monitoring Program Current Daily Rate (May 19, 2011),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/Current_Daily_Rate_for_Lifetime_Elec-
tronic_Monitoring_Program_353451_7.pdf.
214. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520n(2)(c) (West Supp. 2013).
215. Id. § 791.285(1)(a).
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The Legislature controls this debate because it has the constitu-
tional power to determine the punishment for crime.216 The
Legislature may reserve all or most of the sentencing discretion
through enactment of mandatory penalties.217
Mandatory minimum terms constitute one form of mandatory
penalty, and there are three distinct forms: (1) the absolute version,
where there is no discretion to impose a lesser term; (2) the depar-
ture-valve version, where the judge has discretion to depart below
the term in limited circumstances; and (3) the conditional version,
where the judge may impose either a fine or a minimum period of
incarceration.218
Michigan has a large number of conditional mandatory mini-
mum terms for both felony and misdemeanor crimes,219 but there is
little talk of these provisions, as the judge can avoid the mandatory
minimum term by imposition of a fine alone. There are signifi-
cantly fewer absolute and departure-valve mandatory minimum
terms, but those that exist tend to be well known. This Part ad-
dresses the absolute and departure-valve varieties as they apply to
the most common felony offenses. The small number of absolute
and departure-valve mandatory minimum terms is not surprising
because the Legislature appears to take a targeted approach when
reducing or eliminating the trial court’s sentencing discretion.
Mandatory minimum terms have been around since 1877, but the
Legislature repeals them and enacts new provisions as it attempts to
216. People v. Hegwood, 636 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Mich. 2001).
217. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1) (West 2004) (mandatory life without
parole for first-degree murder); id. § 750.520b(2)(c) (mandatory life without parole for CSC
first-degree with victim under thirteen and prior conviction of CSC involving victim under
thirteen); id. § 750.544 (mandatory life for treason); id. § 333.7413(1)(a)–(c) (West 2012)
(mandatory life without parole for second or subsequent violations of sections
333.7401(2)(a)(ii) or (iii), 333.7403(2)(a)(ii) or (iii), and conspiracy to commit these of-
fenses); id. § 750.227b (West 2004) (mandatory two-year, five-year, and ten-year sentences for
felony firearm first, second, or third offenses); id. §§ 750.16(5), .18(7); id. § 333.17764(7)
(West 2008) (mandatory life without parole for adulterating or misbranding drugs and the
sale or manufacture of adulterated or misbranded drugs, all as to two or more persons with
intent to kill or seriously injure); id. §§ 750.200i(2)(e), .204(2)(e), .207(1)(e), .209(1)(e),
.210(2)(e), .211a(2)(f) (West 2004) (mandatory life without parole for explosives and other
injurious substances causing death).
218. There are only two mandatory minimum terms with a true departure valve. See id.
§§ 333.7410(5), 333.7413(4) (West 2012). There are also a large number of crimes—both
felonies and misdemeanors—punishable by a mandatory minimum term or a fine. See, e.g.,
id. § 257.902 (West 2009) (fine or mandatory minimum term of one year for felony motor
vehicle violations); id. § 28.293(1) (West 2012) (fine or mandatory minimum term of one
year for felony false representation in application for state I.D.); id. § 19.142(2) (West 2004)
(fine or not less than ten days for misdemeanor state property violations).
219. See e.g., id. § 19.142 (destruction of state property, minimum term of ten days or fine
of fifty dollars, or both); id. § 257.902 (West 2009) (felony motor vehicle violations, mini-
mum term of one year or fine of not less than 500 dollars, or both).
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“solve particularly vexing crime problems.”220 The problem with
mandatory minimum terms is the lack of individualized sentencing.
The penalty applies regardless of the mitigating circumstances sur-
rounding the offense or the otherwise good character of the
offender. The State Bar of Michigan categorically opposes
mandatory minimum terms due to the lack of judicial discretion.221
A former Michigan Supreme Court justice voiced similar concern
that mandatory minimum terms create “the kind of tension be-
tween the Legislature and the judiciary that classically leads to
making bad law from hard cases.”222
While mandatory minimum terms come and go, history suggests
that it can take more than twenty years to repeal particularly harsh
mandatory minimum terms. The severe mandatory minimum terms
set forth under the 1978 drug laws were repealed in 2003 after years
of debate and legal challenges.223 Likewise, the merciless mandatory
sentences enacted as part of the first habitual offenders laws in 1927
were not repealed until 1949.224
220. Zalman, supra note 11, at 859. One of the first mandatory minimum terms in Michi-
gan history involved a three-year prison sentence for larceny of a horse, second offense (this
penalty no longer exists). The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the 1877 law did not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment because “[t]he larceny of a horse usually, if not nec-
essarily, implies a bad and wicked disposition.” People v. Morris, 45 N.W. 591, 593 (Mich.
1890). Likewise, in 1907 the Legislature provided for a fifteen-year minimum term for bur-
glary with explosives (this provision still exists), and the Michigan Supreme Court concluded
the penalty was not unconstitutional given the “alarming increase” in the use of high explo-
sives. People v. Mire, 138 N.W. 1066, 1067 (Mich. 1912).
221. The State Bar opposes mandatory minimum terms as a matter of principle: “The
State Bar has a long-standing position of opposing any measure that would limit judicial
discretion, which HB 5421 would effectively do by imposing a mandatory minimum sen-
tence.” Letter Regarding HB 5421, Penalties for Certain Sex Offenders, from Janet Welch,
Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Mich., & Elizabeth K. Lyon, Pub. Policy Program Analyst, State
Bar of Mich., to Phillip J. Pavlov, State Representative (Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://www.
michbar.org/publicpolicy/positionpdfs/positionPDF367.pdf; see also United States v. C.R.,
792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing public policy concerns with mandatory
minimum terms).
222. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 893 n.10 (Mich. 1992) (Boyle, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
223. The drug laws were revised in 2002. Act of Dec. 25, 2002, No. 665, 2002 Mich. Pub.
Acts 2455 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401); Act of Dec. 30, 2002, No.
710, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 2641, 2643–44 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.7403). The 1978 drug laws had earlier survived multiple challenges, including a federal
constitutional challenge. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). However, there was
some relief on the parole front. See People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992) (con-
cluding the penalty for possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine had to be parolable life
imprisonment to survive constitutional muster under the Michigan Constitution).
224. See infra notes 273–76 and accompanying text.
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Today, there are only eight mandatory minimum terms left from
the period of 1907 to 1955, and the crimes to which they corre-
spond are rarely seen in the twenty-first century.225 On the other
hand, there are eleven mandatory minimum terms dating from
1959 through 2013, and seven of this group apply to common fel-
ony crimes, while the remaining four relate to offenses involving
wildlife,226 hazardous waste,227 and tobacco stamp violations.228 The
seven mandatory minimum terms are listed below and include two
very recent provisions (both of the absolute variety) that are excep-
tionally long:
Armed robbery with aggravated assault or serious Two-year minimum term
injury.229 Effective 1959.
Criminal sexual conduct first, second, or third Five-year minimum term
degree; second offense.230 Effective 1975.
Delivery or possession with intent to deliver drugs to One- and two-year
minors, students, or near school property.231 minimum terms
Effective 1978, 1988. (departure available)
Delivery or possession with intent to deliver drugs to Five-year minimum term
students or near school property, second offense.232 (departure available)
Effective 1988.
OWI Third Offense.233 Effective 1992. One-year minimum prison
sentence or jail
incarceration of not less
than thirty days
Criminal sexual conduct first-degree by offender Twenty-five-year minimum
seventeen years or older with minor under thirteen term
years.234 Effective 2006.
Habitual offender fourth offense (specified Twenty-five-year minimum
felonies).235 Effective 2012. term
225. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.112 (West 2004) (fifteen-year mandatory mini-
mum term for burglary with explosives, 1907); id. § 45.82 (West 2006) (not less than two
years for illegal acts by county purchasing agent, 1917); id. § 750.361 (West 2004) (not less
than one year for larceny of locomotive parts, 1917); id. § 750.458 (not less than two years for
detaining female in house of prostitution, 1931); id. § 750.210a (not less than two years for
valerium offenses, 1942); id. §§ 35.929, 35.980 (West 2013) (not less than one year for willful
false application for veterans benefits, 1947, 1955).
226. Id. § 324.40118 (West 2009) (wildlife conservation violation, five-, ten- and ninety-
day minimum terms, all misdemeanors, 1995); id. § 324.48738(3) (West Supp. 2013) (illegal
possession of sturgeon, thirty-day minimum term, misdemeanor, 2003).
227. Id. § 324.8905(3) (West 2009) (hazardous waste at health facility, second offense,
one year minimum, felony, 1995).
228. Id. § 205.428(6) (tobacco stamp violation, one year minimum, felony, 1997).
229. Id. § 750.529 (West 2004).
230. Id. § 750.520f.
231. Id. § 333.7410 (West 2012).
232. Id. § 333.7413(3).
233. Id. § 257.625(9)(c) (West 2006).
234. Id. § 750.520b(2)(b) (West Supp. 2013).
235. Id. § 769.12.
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The two longest mandatory minimum terms, which are for CSC
first-degree and the fourth habitual offender, are also the most re-
cent. In 2006, the Legislature added a twenty-five year mandatory
minimum term for CSC first-degree against a victim under the age
of thirteen.236 This was done in response to the rape and murder of
Jessica Lunsford by a convicted sex offender in Florida, as previ-
ously mentioned.237 In October of 2012, the Legislature added the
twenty-five year mandatory minimum term for certain fourth habit-
ual offenders (specified felonies only). This was done in response
to the murder of Larry Nehasil, a Livonia police officer. Officer
Nehasil was murdered by a repeat offender who was being investi-
gated for a series of home invasions.238 These two mandatory
minimum terms appear to be the longest in Michigan’s history, ex-
cluding mandatory life sentences.239
The impact of the two twenty-five year mandatory minimum
terms has been and will be significant. For the CSC offender, the
legislative analysis projected an “indeterminate fiscal impact” that
nevertheless acknowledged “increased incarceration costs” for
those serving “increased incarceration time prior to parole.”240 The
legislative analysis also noted 260 new dispositions for CSC first-de-
gree with a victim under the age of thirteen in 2004 (prior to the
amendment).241 According to the Michigan Department of Correc-
tions’ annual statistics from 2009 to 2011, there was an average of
sixty-nine new commitments each year for CSC first-degree with a
victim under thirteen.242 While undoubtedly some portion of those
offenders would have received twenty-five years imprisonment
before the 2006 amendment, for many offenders that would not
have been the case. The sentencing guidelines range for an individ-
ual convicted of CSC first-degree with no prior record and the
highest offense severity level would be 108 to 180 months.243 In
236. See Act of May 29, 2006, No. 169, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 499; SENATE FISCAL AGENCY,
SENATE FISCAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILLS 709, 717, 718, & 1122 AND HOUSE BILLS 5421, 5422,
5531, & 5532 1 (2006).
237. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
238. Act of Oct. 1, 2012, No. 319, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 136; HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, LEGIS-
LATIVE ANALYSIS: MINIMUM PRISON SENTENCES FOR FOURTH HABITUAL OFFENDERS 1 (2012).
239. There is also a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years for possession with
intent to deliver over 1,000 grams committed by a juvenile offender, but this is one of three
alternative sentencing options available to the court. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.1(5),
(12) (West 2000).
240. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, supra note 236, at 7–8.
241. Id. at 9.
242. COURT DISPOSITIONS, supra note 201, at A-40, A-117, A-191.
243. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.62 (West 2006) (Class A grid). For the sentencing
guidelines range to recommend twenty-five years, the person would have to have a significant
prior record and/or a high offense severity level and some prior record. Id.
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other words, the new mandatory minimum term for CSC first-de-
gree would add approximately ten years imprisonment for those
with no prior criminal record.244
For the fourth habitual offender, it may be too early to predict
the number of people affected since the provision went into effect
in October of 2012. Nonetheless, the estimated impact of this new
law is alarming. The legislative analysis predicts the need for an ad-
ditional 1,600 prison beds after ten years and an additional 7,300
prison beds after twenty-five years.245 The total cost could run as
high as 55.7 million dollars per year after ten years and 250.7 mil-
lion dollars per year after twenty-five years.246 Focusing on the
sentencing guidelines ranges alone, nearly half of the offenders fall-
ing in the Class A crime class would not have a recommended
range reaching 300 months if sentenced as a fourth habitual of-
fender.247 In addition, a sentence of 300 months would be a
departure for nearly all Class B fourth offenders and all Class C and
D fourth offenders.248 In other words, many offenders who fall
under the new fourth habitual offender provision will receive a
much longer sentence.
Notably lacking in these new laws is a departure valve. For drug
offenses and drunk driving, the Legislature provided either a de-
parture valve or an alternative jail and probationary sentence,
respectively.249 There is likewise a movement afoot to remove tough
mandatory minimum terms for some federal crimes.250 Yet, Michi-
gan has moved in the opposite direction with two very heavy
mandatory minimum terms with no departure provisions.
With no discretion on the part of the sentencing judge, the
prison population is likely to increase as judges must impose at least
twenty-five years imprisonment and cannot tailor the sentence to
the facts of the case. Even if the mandatory minimum terms func-
tion more as prosecutorial bargaining tools to induce guilty pleas to
lesser offenses, prison populations will still increase as offenders
who might have won acquittals at trial are frightened into pleading
244. A mandatory minimum term always controls when there is conflict with the sentenc-
ing guidelines range. Id. § 769.34(2)(a).
245. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, FISCAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 1109, at 3 (2013).
246. Id.
247. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 777.61–.62 (West 2006).
248. Id. §§ 777.63–.65.
249. See id. § 333.7413(4) (West 2012) (departure provision for second or subsequent
drug offenses); id. § 257.625(9)(c) (West 2006) (alternative jail and probationary sentence
for drunk driving repeat offenders); see also People v. Fields, 528 N.W.2d 176, 178 (Mich.
1995) (discussing departure provision under drug laws).
250. See United States v. Kupa, No. 11-CR-345, 2013 WL 5550419, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
2013).
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guilty. Indeed, even the presumed deterrent effect of such a harsh
mandatory penalty may be illusory, as studies show no deterrent ef-
fect from mandatory terms in general (this conclusion surprisingly
includes no deterrent effect for the 1977 mandatory felony-firearm
sentences as well).251 Thus, the next several decades may be a par-
ticularly difficult time in Michigan given the harsh new mandatory
minimum terms.
IV. INCREASES IN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING AUTHORITY
Before 1990, there were thirteen consecutive sentencing statutes
in Michigan.252 From 1990 to 2013, the Legislature added twenty-
nine new consecutive sentencing provisions.253 This increase is star-
tling given Michigan’s history as a predominantly concurrent
sentencing state.254
Michigan has always operated under a system of presumptive
concurrent sentencing. There must be statutory authority for the
imposition of consecutive sentences.255 This preference for statu-
tory regulation was based on the historical anomaly that Michigan,
unlike other states, did not import the common law tradition of
discretionary consecutive sentencing into its jurisprudence.256 In-
stead, the authority for consecutive sentencing must come from a
statute, as the Michigan Supreme Court explained in In re Lamphere:
The relations of this commonwealth to the common law are
not all together conformed to the holdings of some other
states. In many of the states, statutes of parliament passed
before or during the early days of the American colonies, as
well as old colonial statutes and usages, have been recognized
as part of the common law and have been construed and ap-
plied by the courts. But Michigan was never a common-law
colony, and while we have recognized the common law as ac-
cepted into our jurisprudence, it is the English common law,
unaffected by statute. In 1810 an act was passed putting an end
to all the written law of England, France, Canada and the
251. See George C. Thomas III & David Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative Crime Con-
trol Theology, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV 123, 136 n.95 (1988); Michael Tony, The Mostly
Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST.
65, 96 (2009).
252. See infra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
253. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
254. See In re Lamphere, 27 N.W. 882 (Mich. 1886).
255. See People v. Sawyer, 302 N.W.2d 534 (Mich. 1981).
256. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163–64, 168–69 (2009).
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Northwest and Indiana territories, as well as the French and
Canadian customs, leaving no statute or code law in force ex-
cept that of Michigan territory and the United States. 1 Terr.
Laws, 900. And while we have kept in our statute books a gen-
eral statute resorting to the common law for all non-
enumerated crimes, there has always been a purpose in our
legislation to have the whole ground of criminal law defined,
as far as possible, by statute. There is no crime whatever pun-
ishable by our laws except by virtue of a statutory provision.
The punishment of all undefined offenses is fixed within
named limits, and beyond the unregulated discretion of the
courts. While we refer with profit to the rulings of other
courts, there are many cases where we cannot regard them as
binding.257
Consecutive sentencing has always been considered “strong
medicine,”258 and it would appear that the Legislature was careful
in crafting only a few consecutive sentencing provisions from 1877
through 1978. The first consecutive sentencing statute provided for
discretionary consecutive sentencing for crimes committed by in-
mates.259 A handful of consecutive sentencing statutes blossomed
over the early years, mostly for inmate crimes.260 In 1977 and 1978,
the Legislature additionally authorized consecutive sentencing for
possession of a weapon during commission of a felony (felony-fire-
arm) and for the commission of certain controlled substance
offenses and “another felony.”261 Altogether, as of 1990 there were
nine statutes that provided for mandatory consecutive sentencing
(mostly for inmate crimes)262 and four that provided for discretion-
ary consecutive sentencing (namely for felony offenses committed
while other felony charges were pending, for serious assaults while
257. 27 N.W. at 883.
258. People v. Chambers, 421 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Mich. 1988) (quoting Salley v. United
States, 786 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1986)).
259. See People v. Huntley, 71 N.W. 178 (1897).
260. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 17, 1927, No. 8, 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 12 (prison escape); Act of
June 16, 1931, No. 328, § 195, 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 624, 663 (jail escape).
261. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227b(2) (West 2004) (felony-firearm); id.
§ 333.7401(3) (West 2012) (manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver cer-
tain major controlled substances).
262. Id. § 750.193 (West 2004) (prison break and escape); id. § 750.195(2) (jail escape
felony); id. § 750.196 (escape county work farm); id. § 750.197(2) (escape awaiting trial fel-
ony); id. § 750.227b (felony-firearm, 1977); id. § 750.349a (prisoner taking hostage, 1973); id.
§ 768.7a (West 2000) (crimes committed while incarcerated or on escape or parole); id.
§ 768.7b(2)(b) (major controlled substance offense committed pending disposition of fel-
ony, 1988); id. § 333.7401 (West 2012) (major controlled substance offense and “another
felony,” mandatory in 1978, discretionary as of 2003).
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detained or incarcerated, and for two provisions specific to Medi-
caid and Condominium Act crimes).263
Surprisingly, the Legislature apparently abandoned the cautious
approach to consecutive sentencing when it added twenty-nine new
provisions from 1994 to 2013. Most provisions accompanied newly
created crimes (e.g., using a computer to commit a crime, 2000;
identity theft, 2005; and false statement in a DNA petition, 2009),
but some exceptions included discretionary consecutive sentencing
for long-standing crimes such as first-degree criminal sexual con-
duct, first-degree home invasion (formerly known as breaking and
entering an occupied dwelling), and resisting an officer.264
This turnaround on consecutive sentencing comes with a price.
While there is no published data on the number of consecutive
sentences imposed in Michigan, and even recognizing that most of
the new provisions authorize discretionary consecutive sentencing,
the sheer number of provisions is important. In 1990, there were
only thirteen statutes that authorized consecutive sentences. In
2013, there were forty-two. This is an increase of 223 percent. In the
legislative analysis accompanying just one of the new consecutive
sentencing provisions, namely for multiple deaths arising out of a
traffic incident, researchers estimated an additional cost of one mil-
lion dollars per year to taxpayers (in 1999 dollars) for each new set
of offenders sentenced for driving offenses involving multiple
263. Id. § 750.506a (West 2004) (certain assaults while detained or incarcerated, 1974);
id. § 768.7b(2)(a) (West 2000) (felony pending disposition of felony, 1988); id. § 400.609(2)
(West 2008) (repeated Medicaid false claims, 1977); id. § 559.258 (West 2004) (Condomin-
ium Act violations, 1983).
264. See id. § 259.80f(6) (West Supp. 2013) (airport weapons, 2002); id. § 333.7401c(5)
(West 2012) (maintaining drug house, lab, vehicle, 2001); id. § 445.69(4) (West 2011) (iden-
tity theft, 2005); id. § 750.50(7) (West Supp. 2013) (animal cruelty, 2008); id. § 750.81d
(West 2004) (resisting officer, 2002); id. § 750.110a (home invasion first-degree, 1994); id.
§ 750.119(3) (corruption of appraisers, jurors, referees, 2001); id. § 750.120a(6) (juror intim-
idation, 2001); id. § 750.122(11) (bribery witness, 2001); id. § 750.145d(3) (using Internet to
commit crime, 1999); id. § 750.174(12) (West Supp. 2013) (embezzlement vulnerable victim,
2007); id. § 750.174a(13) (embezzlement vulnerable adult, 2013); id. § 750.212a(1) (West
2004) (explosives, bombs, vulnerable target, 2002); id. § 750.215 (impersonating peace of-
ficer, 2003); id. § 750.217(f) (West Supp. 2013) (impersonating firefighter, 2006); id.
§ 750.227f (West 2004) (body armor, 2000); id. § 750.411u(2) (West Supp. 2013) (gang in-
volvement and underlying felony, 2009); id. § 750.411v(4) (gang recruitment, 2009); id.
§ 750.422a(2) (false statement in DNA petition, 2009); id. § 750.436(4) (West 2004) (poison-
ing food or drink, 2002); id. § 750.462j(4) (West Supp. 2013) (human trafficking, 2011); id.
§ 750.479(7) (West 2004) (assault on police officer, 2002); id. § 750.479b(4) (taking weapon
from officer, 1994); id. § 750.483a(10) (interfering with court or reporting of crime, 2001);
id. § 750.520b(3) (West Supp. 2013) (CSC first-degree, 2006); id. § 750.520n(4) (lifetime
monitoring violation, 2006); id. § 750.529a (West 2004) (carjacking, 1994); id. § 752.797(4)
(using computer to commit crime, 2000); id. § 769.36(1) (West 2006) (multiple deaths and
operation of vehicle, 2002).
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deaths where it was predicted that the trial judge might impose a
discretionary consecutive sentence.265
Additionally, and anecdotally speaking, the impact of consecu-
tive sentencing on overall sentence length is significant. In a 1997
case where the offender was resentenced for home invasion first-
degree and commission of another felony, the judge converted the
concurrent sentences to consecutive sentences, thereby resulting in
a cumulative sentence of twenty to thirty-five years rather than
twelve to twenty years, as would have been the case with concurrent
sentences.266 In another home invasion case reported in 1998, the
judge exercised discretion to order consecutive sentencing, and the
cumulative sentence length became sixteen to thirty-five years
rather than ten to fifteen years.267 In a CSC first-degree case re-
ported in 2012, the judge imposed consecutive sentences of twenty-
five to fifty years imprisonment, resulting in a cumulative sentence
of fifty to one-hundred years.268 In an even more dramatic example
of the consequences of this trend, the Court of Appeals recently
upheld seven consecutive sentences of forty to sixty years imprison-
ment for seven convictions of CSC first-degree.269 The Court noted
that it would not review the sentences in their aggregate for propor-
tionality purposes. Rather, it must focus on each sentence
individually without consideration of the cumulative effect.270
In sum, today’s judges have much more discretion to impose
consecutive sentences, and the exercise of that discretion increases
the overall sentence in a significant way.
265. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, FISCAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 0257: ENROLLED ANALYSIS 3
(2002).
266. People v. Hill, 561 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming the consecu-
tive sentences of twelve to twenty years for home invasion first-degree and eight to fifteen
years for assault with intent to rob ordered at a resentencing where the judge did not realize
the authority for consecutive sentencing at the original sentencing hearing).
267. People v. St. John, 585 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming consecu-
tive sentences of ten to fifteen years and six to twenty years for involuntary manslaughter and
home invasion first-degree).
268. People v. Ryan, 819 N.W.2d 55, 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming consecutive
sentences of twenty-five to fifty years and twenty-five to fifty years for CSC first-degree).
269. People v. Brown, No. 308510, 2013 WL 3942486, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2013)
(affirming seven consecutive sentences of forty to sixty years imprisonment for seven convic-
tions of first-degree CSC).
270. Id. at *3 (citing People v. Warner, 476 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), and Peo-
ple v. Hardy, 537 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)).
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V. HABITUAL OFFENDERS AND REPEAT DRUG OFFENDERS
Sentencing the habitual offender has always been a challenge.
The delicate balance between rehabilitation, deterrence, protection
of society, and punishment271 tends to weigh heavily in favor of
harsh punishment. As with most sentencing decisions, however,
there is no universally approved punishment, and attitudes toward
the sentencing of habitual offenders have fluctuated over time.
With the advent of the statutory sentencing guidelines, the recom-
mended range of punishment for the habitual offender and repeat
drug offenders is quite wide, leaving a large degree of discretion in
the hands of the sentencing judge.
While there were habitual offender laws in existence in the
1800s,272 the first habitual offender laws included in our modern
Code of Criminal Procedure were enacted in 1927 in response to a
serious increase in crime following World War I.273 These enhanced
sentences were harsh and often mandatory.274 The mandatory
terms were repealed in 1949 in favor of a discretionary sentence
enhancement scheme.275 The 1949 revisions also offered the prose-
cutor discretion to charge or not charge the offender as a habitual
offender.276  The 1949 law did not provide for indeterminate sen-
tencing, and the Legislature did not authorize indeterminate
sentencing for habitual offender sentences until 1978.277 While
there was a right to a jury trial for the habitual offender enhance-
ment as part of the 1949 law, this right was eliminated in 1994.278
The sentencing guidelines were not made applicable to habitual
offender sentences until 1999.279
One problem with applying the statutory sentencing guidelines
to habitual offenders is the very large ranges provided for the re-
peat offender. By statute, the top level of the sentencing range is
increased by twenty-five percent, fifty percent, and one hundred
271. These are the state’s four articulated sentencing goals. People v. Coles, 339 N.W.2d
440, 453 (Mich. 1983) (citing People v. Snow, 194 N.W.2d 314 (Mich. 1972)).
272. People v. Campbell, 139 N.W. 24, 25 (Mich. 1912).
273. See 1 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 424, 608; People v. Stoudemire, 414 N.W.2d 693, 695
(Mich. 1987).
274. For certain fourth habitual offenders, the mandatory sentence was life without pa-
role. For the third offender, there was a mandatory minimum term of seven and one half
years. See People v. Palm, 223 N.W. 67 (Mich. 1929); In re Southard, 298 N.W. 457 (Mich.
1941); Stoudemire, 414 N.W.2d at 695.
275. Brinson v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 272 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Mich. 1978); Stoudemire, 414
N.W.2d at 699–700.
276. Brinson, 272 N.W.2d at 515.
277. People v. Wright, 437 N.W.2d 603, 605–06 (Mich. 1989).
278. People v. Zinn, 551 N.W.2d 704, 706–07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
279. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.21(3) (West 2006).
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percent for the second, third, and fourth offender, respectively.280
While these increases are lower than the increases permitted for the
maximum sentence,281 the sentencing commission, and ultimately
the Legislature, made a policy choice that appears to have been the
subject of some debate. In the final report to the Legislature dated
December 2, 1997, the sentencing commission recommended the
habitual offender ranges that are set forth above.282 Yet, only weeks
earlier, the commission had intended to recommend increases of
five percent, ten percent, and fifteen percent.283 Research at the
time showed that approximately nineteen percent of offenders
were being sentenced as habitual offenders.284
Unfortunately, the choice of a higher level of enhancement cre-
ated very broad sentencing ranges. The ranges can be as wide as
fifteen to fifty years for an individual convicted of second degree
murder as a fourth habitual offender and nine to thirty years for
one convicted of armed robbery as a fourth habitual offender.285
These are ranges for the minimum sentence only. The problem
with “very large guideline sentencing ranges” is the disparity in sen-
tencing it produces, especially between metropolitan and out-of-
state areas.286 According to a 2008 study conducted by the National
Center for State Courts, “the probability of going to prison is 10–15
percent higher in out-state Michigan and the length of sentence is
25–30 percent greater.”287
From a historical perspective, were the sentences for habitual of-
fenders lower or higher before the advent of the statutory
sentencing guidelines? The answer is likely higher in 1929, when
there were mandatory terms, but it is harder to tell moving into the
1980s and 1990s. For some habitual offenders, the judges increased
the maximum term but did little to the minimum term.288 For other
offenders, judges increased both the minimum and maximum
280. Id.
281. Id. § 769.10 (West 2000) (fifty percent for second offender); id. § 769.11 (West
2000) (one hundred percent for third offender); id. § 769.12 (life or fifteen years for the
fourth offender depending on whether the underlying maximum term is above or below five
years imprisonment).
282. MALONEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 26.
283. Id. app. C, at 8.
284. Id. app. C, at 2.
285. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 777.61–.62 (West 2006).
286. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 163, at 15–16.
287. Id.
288. See e.g., People v. Fountain, 282 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Mich. 1979) (original sentence of
ten to fifteen years for unarmed robbery, increased to ten to thirty years as fourth habitual
offender); People v. Johnson, 317 N.W.2d 645, 646–49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (same sentence
of ten to thirty years for underlying crime of armed robbery and enhancement with second
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terms to a large degree.289 As with any sentencing decision, the ap-
propriate punishment was often in the eye of the beholder.
All things considered, today’s habitual offenders face very wide
sentencing ranges and some face a mandatory minimum term of
twenty-five years.290 Moreover, the unspoken question is whether
the Legislature will wait another twenty years to modify or repeal
the new mandatory minimum term as it did with the stiff 1927 ha-
bitual offender punishments.291
There is much less room to doubt that repeat drug offenders are
punished more severely under the statutory sentencing guidelines
than before the guidelines, even in comparison to the punishment
of habitual offenders. The statutory guidelines are silent as to the
level of enhancement appropriate for individuals convicted under
Mich. Comp. Laws Section 333.7413 (the second drug offender
provision),292 but a 2007 amendment provided for the scoring of
offense variables relating to the underlying crime and the public
trust category (the latter category applies to all second drug offend-
ers).293 Additionally, through the combination of a Michigan
Supreme Court case holding that the sentencing guidelines ranges
could be doubled for the repeat drug offender,294 and a Court of
Appeals decision that assumed—arguably in dicta—that both the
top and bottom numbers of the range could be doubled,295 trial
judges are now permitted to sentence repeat drug offenders within
a range that is higher than that provided for the third habitual of-
fender (although both enhancement statutes permit the same
habitual offender); People v. Johnson, 348 N.W.2d 716, 717, 720 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (sen-
tence of three to five years for larceny over one hundred dollars enhanced to five to twenty
years as fourth habitual offender).
289. See e.g., People v. Odendahl, 505 N.W.2d 16, 16 (1993) (ten to fifteen years for felo-
nious assault as a fourth habitual offender); cf. People v. Hansford, 562 N.W.2d 460, 461
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (forty to sixty years imprisonment for breaking and entering an occu-
pied dwelling and receiving and concealing stolen property, both as a fourth habitual
offender). But see People v. Curry, 371 N.W.2d 854, 859–60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing
life imprisonment for breaking and entering a motor vehicle as a fourth habitual offender).
290. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.12 (West Supp. 2013).
291. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
292. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.18 (West Supp. 2013).
293. Act of Jan. 8, 2007, No. 655, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 2312 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 777.21).
294. People v. Lowe, 773 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Mich. 2009).
295. People v. Williams, 707 N.W.2d 624, 632–33 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
688 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:3
doubling of the penalty).296 There is no increased floor for the sen-
tencing guidelines ranges for the habitual offender, but there
appears to be an increased floor for the repeat drug offender.297
In sum, while many viewed the guidelines’ inclusion of the habit-
ual offender (and to a lesser extent the repeat drug offender) as a
major improvement over the earlier years of less regulated repeat
offender sentencing,298 that assessment may be called into question
by the very large ranges available for the habitual offender and the
doubling of the range on both ends for the repeat drug offender.
VI. INCREASING LENGTH OF PRISON STAY BEFORE PAROLE
Parole policy and practice can have a profound impact on the
amount of time an individual serves. Discussion of the Michigan
parole system could easily justify its own article, but what follows is a
summary of the major changes in parole eligibility and approval
rates over the years with particular emphasis placed on the period
between 1992 and the present.
By the late 1880s, and before official commencement of indeter-
minate sentencing in 1903, Michigan had a parole system and also
statutory authority for release based on good behavior. The first
good-time statute can be traced to 1857, when inmates could re-
ceive a two-month reduction of their sentence during each of the
first three years and a reduction of up to seventy-five days per year
during the third, fourth, and fifth years, all the way up to six
months per year during the twentieth and subsequent years.299 This
system remained substantially intact through 1978.
Michigan was also one of the first states to develop a parole sys-
tem in the years 1885 to 1886. This nascent parole system was
technically more a system of conditional pardons and commuta-
tions.300 Nonetheless, regardless of the label of the new system,
296. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7413 (West 2012) (allowing double the pen-
alty for repeat drug offenders), with id. § 769.11 (West 2006) (allowing double the penalty for
the third habitual offender).
297. See id. § 777.21(3) (West Supp. 2013).
298. People v. Cervantes, 532 N.W.2d 831, 835–36 (Mich. 1995) (Cavanagh, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (using the judicial sentencing guidelines as a benchmark
to sentence habitual offenders aids the proportionality analysis applicable to all sentences).
299. In re Walsh, 49 N.W. 606, 607 (Mich. 1891).
300. See 2 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 611; see, e.g., People v. Moore, 29 N.W. 80, 81 (Mich.
1886).
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good behavior in prison was rewarded by early release into the
community.301
For years, Michigan prisoners received two rewards for good be-
havior: good time reductions and release into the community via
the parole process. The good-time statutes stayed in force until
1978, when a ballot proposal (Proposal B of 1978) eliminated good-
time credits for those convicted of certain assaultive offenses.302 In
1982, the good-time statute was amended to allow disciplinary cred-
its (less favorable than good time credits) for the earlier Proposal B
offenders.303 In 1986, disciplinary credits were substituted for good-
time credits for all offenders, with a few limited exceptions.304 In
1998, disciplinary credits were eliminated for most assaultive
crimes, and in 2000 the entire system of disciplinary credits was
eliminated.305 As of December 15, 2000, Michigan operates under a
system of truth-in-sentencing, where the offender must serve the en-
tire minimum term before becoming eligible for parole.306 Truth-
in-sentencing not only eliminates early release for good behavior,
but also eliminates placement of some prisoners into community
residential programs before their minimum terms have expired.307
Apart from the major transition to truth-in-sentencing, the pa-
role practices and policies in Michigan changed significantly from
1992 onward following the tragic release of serial killer Leslie Allen
Williams.308 After Williams was released on parole and killed several
young women in 1991 and 1992, Governor John Engler revised the
parole board, changing it from a board of civil service employees to
301. 1 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 457 (“Michigan was one of the first states to develop the
parole system. Since 1896 good behavior in prisons has been rewarded by this means.”);
People v. Cummings, 50 N.W. 310, 314 (Mich. 1891) (“The term of imprisonment depends
upon the ability of the convict to please the prison officials in his deportment, and not upon
the enormity of his offense.”).
302. See Act of Nov. 7, 1978, Initiated Law, 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 2632, 2632–33 (codified
as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 791.233, .233b).
303. Act of Dec. 30, 1982, No. 422, 1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 1720, 1720–21 (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33).
304. See Act of Dec. 24, 1986, No. 322, 1986 Mich. Pub. Acts 1511 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33).
305. See Act of June 24, 1994, No. 217, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 962; Act of June 24, 1994,
No. 218, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 977; Act of July 28, 1998, No. 315, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1261;
Act of July 28, 1998, No. 316, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1272; Miriam A. Cavanagh, If You Do the
Crime, You Will Do the Time: A Look at the New “Truth in Sentencing” Law in Michigan, 77 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 375, 384 (2000).
306. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.234(2) (West 2007).
307. See id. § 791.265(2); see, e.g., id. § 791.265a; cf. People v. Woods, 535 N.W.2d 259
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
308. William D. Adams, The Prosecutorial Appeal of Parole: The Indigent Prisoner’s Right to
Counsel, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 177, 180–81 (1994).
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a board of political appointees:309 “The primary goal of the reorgan-
ization was to increase public safety by minimizing the number of
dangerous and assaultive offenders being placed on parole.”310 The
intent was to make communities safer “by making more criminals
serve more time and keeping many more locked up for as long as
possible.”311
A Michigan Department of Corrections report summarizing pa-
role practices from 1992 to 1997 described the new parole board as
“far more conservative than its predecessor” and “much less willing
to release criminals at all, forcing many to serve their maximum
sentences.”312 The report stressed the board’s interest in preventing
crime and the desire “to keep them [inmates] locked up longer.
[The former inmates] got out only because courts and statutes re-
quired them to be released.”313
Inmates serving parolable life sentences were hit particularly
hard by changes put into effect by the new board and Legislature.
The frequency of parole interviews for offenders serving parolable
life sentences was reduced in 1992 and again in 1999, but the posi-
tion the parole board took in 1992 was that “life means life,” even
for those serving parolable life.314 Although many sentencing
judges imposed a life sentence before 1992 with the assumption
that the inmate would be eligible for parole, and presumptively re-
leased on parole after twelve to twenty years,315 this was no longer
the state’s practice, and there was no right to resentencing.316
Putting aside the predicament faced by those serving parolable
life sentences, the parole review process changed for all inmates
from 1992 forward. Inmates won the right to appeal a parole denial
in 1982 but then lost that right in 1999.317 Prosecutors and victims
gained the right to appeal parole decisions in 1992.318 Parole guide-
lines went into effect in 1994, and although the board was required
to follow those guidelines absent a departure for substantial and
309. People v. Hill, 705 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Act of Sept. 21, 1992, No.
181, 1992 Mich. Pub. Act 1123, 1124 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.231a).
310. Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 141 (quoting the Michigan Parole Board website).
311. Id. (quoting former MDOC Director Kenneth L. McGinnis).
312. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., FIVE YEARS AFTER—AN ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN PAROLE
BOARD SINCE 1992, at 2 (1997), available at http://www.capps-mi.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/09/Five-years-after-An-analysis-of-the-parole-board-since-1992.pdf.
313. Id.
314. Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 142; see, e.g., People v. Scott, 743 N.W.2d 62, 63 (Mich. 2008)
(Kelly, J., dissenting from denial of leave to appeal).
315. See Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 141.
316. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 664 N.W.2d 700, 701–02 (Mich. 2003).
317. Morales v. Mich. Parole Bd., 676 N.W.2d 221, 226–27 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
318. Id. at 227.
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compelling reasons,319 little case law developed as inmates subse-
quently lost the right to enforce those guidelines through judicial
review.320 Even today, statistics show offenders with a parole guide-
lines score reflecting a high probability of parole are often passed
over for parole when the crime is assaultive or sexual in nature.321
All of this naturally leads to a discussion of parole approval rates.
The average annual parole approval rate was sixty-six percent in the
years 1976 to 1992 but decreased to fifty-four percent from 1992 to
2006.322 In 1991, only 16.5 percent of prisoners were not paroled on
their earliest release dates, while in 2003 nearly thirty-five percent
of prisoners were serving past the first parole eligibility date.323 In
the last five years, the parole approval rate has climbed from 52.5
percent (2007) to 65.1 percent (2012), with an average annual rate
of sixty percent.324 However, increased parole approval rates often
correspond to periods of high prison population and a contempo-
raneous effort to parole those who were previously denied parole.
The prison population in Michigan skyrocketed to an all time high
of 51,554 inmates in 2007,325 and the parole approval rate rose in
response. Nevertheless, corrections officials are now seeing fewer
inmates who are eligible for parole, and the prison population is
expected to grow from 43,594 at the end of 2102 to 45,000 by Au-
gust of 2016.326
The big picture, which looks at parole from its inception, sug-
gests a major change in the parole and release policies of the state
over time. As initially conceived, “[t]he parole system constitutes a
319. Act of Sept. 21, 1992, No. 181, 1992 Mich. Pub. Act 1123, 1125–26 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 791.233e).
320. The only notable decision reversing a parole denial came from Scholtz v. Michigan
Parole Board, 585 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
321. CITIZENS ALLIANCE ON PRISONS & PUB. SPENDING, DENYING PAROLE AT FIRST ELIGIBIL-
ITY: HOW MUCH PUBLIC SAFETY DOES IT ACTUALLY BUY? 5, 8 (2009); Richard Stapleton, Real
Truth in Sentencing Could Save Really Big Prison Dollars, BRIDGE MICH. (Mar. 29, 2012), available
at http://bridgemi.com/2012/03/guest-column-real-truth-in-sentencing-could-save-really-
big-prison-dollars/.
322. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., GROWTH IN MICHIGAN’S CORRECTIONS SYSTEM:
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 12 (2008).
323. THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW, supra note 7, at 171.
324. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 1, at 1; MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE: PRISON POPULATION PROJECTION REPORT, FEBRUARY 2011, at 4 (2011); MICH.
DEP’T OF CORR., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: PRISON POPULATION PROJECTION REPORT, JANU-
ARY 2010, at 4 (2010); MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: PRISON
POPULATION PROJECTION REPORT, JANUARY 2009, at 3, 5 (2009).
325. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: PRISON POPULATION PROJECTION
REPORT, FEBRUARY 2012, at 1 (2012).
326. Id.; MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 1, at 3, 7.
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means for gradually re-orienting the prisoner to the duties of citi-
zenship.”327 The purpose of parole was to place the inmate beyond
the bounds of the prison “so that he may have an opportunity to
show that he can refrain from committing crime.”328 Yet, as now
construed, the parole process looks more closely at the crime com-
mitted and requires greater assurance that some offenders (namely
lifers and those serving sex crimes) have reformed.329 Moreover, for
the first time in the state’s history, inmates no longer receive good-
time or disciplinary credits for good behavior and must serve one
hundred percent or more of the minimum sentence.
VII. RULES THAT SURFACE, RETREAT, AND REAPPEAR
Increased sentence length and prolonged prison stays are easily
traced to new laws and parole practices that serve to extend the
length of a given sentence. However, sentence length can also be
extended by the absence of rules that previously served to limit the
overall minimum and maximum terms. Three previously existing
rules fit this category.
The first is known as the Stoudemire rule. Michigan’s habitual of-
fender statutes were enacted in 1927, and they were adopted
without revision from the New York habitual offender statutes.330
The New York courts had construed their statutes to require habit-
ual offender penalties only when the offender had been convicted
in separate proceedings and had an opportunity to reform between
convictions.331 This was the rule adopted by the Michigan Supreme
Court in 1987 in a case called People v. Stoudemire.332 However, the
Michigan Supreme Court overruled the Stoudemire case in 2008.333
The 2008 Court relied on the “plain text” of the statutes, which did
not include a “same transaction” prohibition.334
Elimination of the Stoudemire rule has had a very significant effect
on the sentencing of habitual offenders, since prosecutors now
have discretion to seek sentence enhancement as a fourth habitual
offender for an individual who has three prior convictions that
327. 1 DUNBAR, supra note 9, at 457.
328. In re Eddinger, 211 N.W. 54, 54–55 (Mich. 1926).
329. See Parole Approval Rates by Offense Group, MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.michi-
gan.gov/documents/corrections/Parole_Approval_Rates_190318_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 29,
2013); cf. Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 360, 363 (6th Cir. 2010).
330. People v. Stoudemire, 414 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Mich. 1987).
331. Id. at 696.
332. Id.
333. People v. Gardner, 753 N.W.2d 78, 91 (Mich. 2008).
334. Id. at 81.
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arose from a single act or transaction. The previous requirement
that there must be three separate opportunities to reform before
exposing the individual to a life-maximum penalty or up to fifteen
years imprisonment is now gone.335
Despite the absence of a Stoudemire rule under the case law, the
Legislature has continued to recognize the Stoudemire rule in two
distinct settings. When scoring Offense Variable 13 (pattern of
crimes over a period of five years), the trial court shall “not count
more than 1 controlled substance offense arising out of the crimi-
nal episode for which the person is being sentenced,”336 and with
the new twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term for fourth habit-
ual offenders, “[n]ot more than 1 conviction arising out of the
same transaction shall be considered a prior conviction . . . .”337
These two exceptions suggest at least some continued acceptance of
the same-transaction prohibition when increasing a sentence based
on past conduct.
Another sentencing rule with a modest but important limitation
on sentence length was the Life Expectancy Rule. In 1888, the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed a fifty-year sentence for a twenty-
three-year-old offender convicted of forcing himself upon his ten-
year-old cousin while in a highly inebriated state.338 The girl was not
injured, either physically or emotionally, and the family did not
wish to prosecute.339 The Supreme Court ordered a new trial but
observed that the sentence was also excessive and unconstitutional
because it exceeded the life expectancy of the offender:
There is another feature of this case to which we wish to call
special attention, and that relates to the sentence imposed. It
is for 50 years, and will very likely reach beyond the natural life
of the respondent, unrestrained of his liberty, and overreach
by 10 or 15 years his natural life if so restrained. We see noth-
ing in this record warranting any such sentence, and it must be
regarded as excessive. It will not do to say the executive may
apply the remedy in such a case. We do not know what the
executive may do, and it is but a poor commentary upon the
judiciary when it becomes necessary for the executive to regu-
late the humanity of the bench. But the constitution has not
left the liberty of the citizen of any state entirely to the indis-
cretion or caprice of its judiciary, but enjoins upon all that
335. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.12 (West 2006).
336. Id. § 777.43(2)(e).
337. Id. § 769.12(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013).
338. People v. Murray, 40 N.W. 29 (Mich. 1888).
339. Id. at 30–31.
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unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. Where the punish-
ment for an offense is for a term of years, to be fixed by the
judge, it should never be made to extent beyond the average
period of persons in prison life, which seldom exceeds 25
years.340
In 1989, the Michigan Supreme Court formally adopted a life
expectancy rule for individuals sentenced under statutes that per-
mitted “life, or any term of years,” reasoning that a sentence longer
than the offender’s life violated the statute.341 The so-called Moore
rule was in place for five brief years before it was impliedly over-
ruled by a more conservative Supreme Court in a series of decisions
between 1994 and 1997.342 However, the 1888 Murray case has never
been overruled, and some note it relied not on statutory construc-
tion but on constitutional excessiveness.343
A statutory life expectancy rule might not dramatically reduce
the state’s prison population because reducing a thirty-year-old of-
fender’s sentence from one hundred to 200 years to sixty to ninety
years is not likely to reduce the overall length of prison stay for that
offender,344 but the rule nevertheless has important policy implica-
tions for the state. Michigan’s current problem, as explained
throughout this Article, is excessive punishment. A life expectancy
rule reinforces the need for punishment that is proportionate to
the offense and the offender.
Finally, there is the Tanner rule, which states that the minimum
sentence may not exceed two-thirds of the maximum sentence.345
This limitation was set in place in 1972 when the Michigan Su-
preme Court concluded that a minimum sentence that is only days
shorter than the maximum sentence frustrates the indeterminate
sentencing law because it does not allow “a sufficient interval of
time to guarantee that the corrections authorities will be able to
exercise their jurisdiction of judgment with any practicality.”346 The
340. Id. at 16–17.
341. People v. Moore, 439 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Mich. 1989).
342. People v. Kelly, 539 N.W.2d 538, 540–41 (Mich. 1995) (noting implicit overruling of
Moore by Merriweather decision); see also People v. Merriweather, 527 N.W.2d 460 (Mich.
1994); People v. Lemons, 562 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 1997).
343. See People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 874 n.18 (Mich. 1992) (noting constitutional
analysis in Murray).
344. The statutory sentencing guidelines currently permit a sentence of up to one hun-
dred years for an individual convicted of second-degree murder without reference to the age
of the offender. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.61 (West 2006).
345. People v. Tanner, 199 N.W.2d 202, 204–05 (Mich. 1972).
346. Id.
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Legislature agreed and incorporated this rule in the statutory sen-
tencing guidelines in 1999.347 However, the Supreme Court
substantially cut back on the Tanner rule in 2004 when it concluded
that the rule did not apply to crimes for which the maximum pen-
alty was life or any term of years.348
The Tanner rule raises two areas of concern. First, many debate
the wisdom of the 2004 decision, as it leaves no cap on the mini-
mum sentence for a very large number of crimes. The Legislature
has not stepped in to remedy this problem. Additionally, what is
interesting about the Tanner rule is the Supreme Court’s choice of
a two-thirds rule rather than some other mathematical approach.
Michigan’s 1905 indeterminate sentence act provided for a mini-
mum term that could not exceed one-half of the statutory
maximum penalty.349 The American Bar Association recommended
a one-third rule when the Tanner case was decided.350 The Supreme
Court acknowledged the ABA Minimum Standards but reasoned
that “Michigan’s statutory provisions relating to regular and special
good time credits in conjunction with the rule we hereby adopt to-
day fairly approximates the objective of the American Bar
Association’s minimum standards 3.2(c)(iii).”351 Given the abolish-
ment of good-time and disciplinary credits in 1998, the two-thirds
rule now appears antiquated and in need of reform.
CONCLUSION
Michigan attempted comprehensive sentencing reform in 1998
with new sentencing guidelines and also revised dollar thresholds
for a number of property crimes. However, in the intervening fif-
teen years, the state has veered off course with dozens of new laws
undoing much of what had been previously accomplished. The cu-
mulative effect of the new laws has been to increase minimum and
maximum sentences with little to no movement in the opposite di-
rection. The “get tough” approach to parole since 1992 has
similarly led to longer prison stays, longer sentences via truth-in-
sentencing, and the long-term commitment of individuals serving
347. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.34(2)(b) (West 2006).
348. People v. Powe, 679 N.W.2d 67, 67 (Mich. 2004); People v. Washington, 795 N.W.2d
816 (Mich. 2011).
349. Act of June 7, 1905, No. 184, 1905 Mich. Pub. Acts 268, 268; see also Ex parte Richards,
114 N.W. 348, 349 (Mich. 1907).
350. Tanner, 199 N.W.2d at 204–05.
351. Id.
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parolable life sentences despite the often contrary intent of the sen-
tencing judge.
Term-limited legislators, through no fault of their own, may lack
the depth of experience necessary to recognize the problems
caused by a system that now elevates retail fraud to a five-year maxi-
mum penalty when the crime was created to avoid charging the
offender with a four-year offense. They may not recognize the lack
of proportionality resulting from a sentencing scheme that treats
home invasion with a gun the same as obtaining a person’s money
by false pretense. Additionally, there may be no institutional mem-
ory of the state’s unique consecutive sentencing history or the
decades it can take to remove mandatory minimum terms that were
passed to deal with the pressing problems of the day. Viewed as a
whole, and in light of years of steadily increasing penalties, Michi-
gan’s sentencing scheme and parole system are in need of
meaningful, comprehensive reform.
